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ABSTRACT

There has been widespread concern about self-censorship on university campuses, and especially that conservative voices are being stifled. Using survey data from a private elite college, we show that self-censorship is not simply about being conservative: it is students with the most moderate views who self-censor the most. This pattern is associated with confidence and salience — students who are more confident in their views or who see an issue as especially important tend to hold more extreme views and to self-censor less. At the same time, conservatives self-censor at higher rates than liberals, and the same individual is more likely to self-censor on the views where they are relatively more conservative than on those where they are relatively more liberal; conservatives are also far more likely than liberals to cite concerns about social exclusion as a reason for self-censoring, and report self-censoring less outside the university community. Groups perceived as marginalized self-censor less than majority groups, and especially so on issues salient to them (e.g., Black students on BLM).

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1 Introduction

Concerns about self-censorship have become a prominent feature of public debate over the past decade, driven by rising political polarization, a series of high-profile controversies over campus speech, and growing attention to the social and professional costs of expressing certain views. Universities are a natural focus of this debate as places where the free exchange of ideas is not merely tolerated but essential, both to scholarly progress and to training citizens capable of engaging productively with disagreement (Ben-Porath, 2017; Whittington, 2022). Yet trust in higher education has plummeted since 2015, especially among Republicans (Jones, 2026). The university is perceived by some as no longer a place where ideas are freely exchanged, but a place where progressive political agendas are pushed.[1] If students routinely withhold their views, or hold systematically mistaken beliefs about what their peers actually think, this bears on what a college education teaches about civil discourse and on whether public perceptions of campus climate are accurate.

Ideological imbalances among the faculty fuel these concerns: in 2022, more than 80% of Harvard professors identified as liberal or very liberal compared to 1.5% who identified as conservative or very conservative (Xu, 2022).[2] Though most courses are not political (Light et al., 2026), reviews of syllabi on contentious topics find that assigned readings disproportionately reflect the more liberal position on an issue, often omitting counter-arguments (Shields et al., 2026). Concerns about deteriorating trust have resulted in university leadership studying it directly, with a call to narrow the mission of its university down to "create, disseminate, and preserve knowledge through research and teaching" (Yale University Committee on Trust in Higher Education, 2026).

In this paper we use survey data to investigate how the ideological tilt of one college campus–Duke University–affects who self-censors their opinions on controversial topics and why they do so. The survey elicits beliefs on topics such as abortion, puberty blockers for minors, and Black Lives Matter, as well as their perceptions of what the average student believes. And importantly for understanding what views are deemed acceptable, students are asked for the range of views that would be exhibited on their ideal campus: the Overton window. Students are additionally asked how often they share their beliefs on these topics as well as their reasons for self-censoring.

In an environment where both students (this paper) and faculty (Wang, 2024) as a whole identify as left of center, students who hold more conservative views on politically-charged

[1] Yet minority groups too report staying silent in the classroom, in part because of their under-represented status and fearing backlash (Lacy, 2024).

[2] By late 2025, the share of Harvard professors who identified as conservative or very conservative had jumped markedly to 10% (Mao and Paulus, 2025).

topics are less likely to share those views than those on the left.[3] Yet consistent with the model of rational silence in Sarkar and Hadfield (2026), those with more moderate views share their views the least as they see politically-charged topics as less important or have less confidence in their opinions than those with more extreme views. As a result, more moderate views are especially under-represented.

That conservatives self-censor more than liberals at Duke is not because they self-censor more in general. Indeed, we find that liberals are more likely to self-censor with those outside of Duke than conservatives. Rather, self-censorship at Duke is associated with being out of the acceptable range of views—the Overton windows—of those to the left of one's own view (but not to the right of one's view). The link between self-censorship and fear of those on the left is reinforced by a second pattern: students who perceive the average student view on a topic as more liberal are more reluctant to express their views on that topic. This is consistent with Perrin et al. (2025) who find that those on the left are more willing to use repressive techniques to stop speech they disagree with. And when asked directly why they self-censor, conservatives are much more likely to report doing so out of fear of social exclusion than their liberal counterparts.

In contrast, groups traditionally viewed as marginalized (female, black, and non-straight students) are significantly less likely to self-censor out of fear of social exclusion. Indeed, we find that more liberal views are also associated with smaller Overton windows, a result partly driven by more liberal students expressing more support for speech restrictions. It may also be driven by sorting into college campuses: to choose to attend a school like Duke as a conservative is itself an indication of tolerance for ideas different from one's own.[4]

Our work builds on theoretical models of why students self-censor. If speaking up on a topic reveals something about one's type, a listener may shade toward the safe, majority-approved position to protect her reputation (Morris, 2001), particularly when a topic seems unimportant relative to the value of being well thought of in the future (Bernheim, 1994). Because speech is more easily observed than underlying beliefs, individuals may rationally imitate the speech of others regardless of their private beliefs, so that an initial disparity in who speaks first can cascade into an apparent consensus that overstates its true support (Bikhchandani et al., 1992). And because identity and social image carry direct utility, expressing a view that clashes with a valued social identity or with the norms attached to a social category is itself costly (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Bénabou and Tirole, 2011). Each mechanism predicts that observed speech

[3]Duke is by no means an outlier among elite institutions. Kettles and Trapanick (2026) show that 65.6% of Harvard graduates in 2026 identify as very progressive or progressive. And Aibel and Stasiuk (2024) show that 78.2% of Yale students identified as very left-leaning or somewhat left-leaning in 2024.

[4]Acton et al. (2025) find that both liberal and conservatives are willing to pay to be on campuses with those of similar political views.

is a biased signal of underlying belief, and each implies that the bias should be systematically related to how a person's view sits relative to the views she perceives around her—the object we measure directly in this paper.

These mechanisms compound because perceptions of the prevailing consensus are themselves shaped by who chooses to speak. The spiral of silence in Noelle-Neumann (1974) postulates that individuals who perceive their views to be in the minority are more likely to stay silent, which reinforces the appearance of consensus that kept them silent; the concept of preference falsification in Kuran (1995) shows how sustained silence can conceal the true distribution of opinion, producing abrupt shifts in public discourse once the falsified consensus finally breaks. A substantial economics literature documents biased perceptions of prevailing social norms along these lines—from campus drinking norms (Prentice and Miller, 1993) to women's labor force participation in Saudi Arabia (Bursztyn et al., 2020a) to attitudes toward gender roles more broadly (Bursztyn et al., 2026)—and shows that correcting such misperceptions changes behavior (Bursztyn and Yang, 2022). Political beliefs appear similarly distorted: voters and political elites systematically misjudge the ideological composition of the other side (Ahler and Sood, 2018; Broockman and Skovron, 2018); people tend to believe that those who disagree with them hold more extreme beliefs than they actually do and that those who disagree with them are less confident in their beliefs (Blatz and Mercier, 2018). Self-reinforcing silence can also fuel polarization, as groups drift toward more extreme positions once dissenting voices go unheard (Sunstein, 2002), producing echo chambers in which the prevailing view goes unchallenged (Abramowitz and Saunders, 2008). Because we elicit both students' own views and their beliefs about the average view on campus, our design allows us to test for distortions of this kind.

These issues are especially salient on college campuses. National surveys find that many students and faculty report reluctance to express their views on controversial political and social topics on campus (Kaufmann, 2021; Stevens, 2023; Zhou and Barbaro, 2023). Campus-specific studies reach similar conclusions: surveys at individual universities document substantial shares of students, across the political spectrum, who report withholding their views in class discussions (Revers and Traunmüller, 2020). Students are much more likely to reveal privately than publicly that they are conservative (Greenberg and Stone, 2025), with conservative and moderate students also most likely to be censored by others (Clark et al., 2020; Grady and Lewis, 2024; Diehl et al., 2025). Along with interview evidence on the broader landscape of campus political activism (Binder and Kidder, 2022), this work establishes that self-censorship is common and unevenly distributed. What it cannot establish is whether the costs students anticipate from speaking are real, since self-reports of reticence are, by construction, silent on the counterfactual: what would have happened had the student spoken.

By comparison, our design makes progress on this question along three dimensions. First,

because we measure students' perceptions of the average student belief alongside the true average, a systematic and ideologically patterned gap between the two is itself evidence that self-censorship is occurring, and lets us identify which particular views are being suppressed. Second, because opinions are measured on a 0–100 scale across eight topics, we can locate withheld views in terms of their relative ideological position, distinguishing the suppression of mainstream views from the suppression of fringe ones. Third, context-specific questions about the classroom, the rest of campus, and off-campus settings let us separate self-censorship confined to campus from a more general reticence that would appear regardless of where a student found herself. And by eliciting each student's own tolerance for disagreement—her personal Overton window—we can test directly whether self-censorship tracks the actual, rather than merely feared, intolerance of one's peers, instead of inferring peer intolerance from the fact that a student chose to stay silent.

Our work also relates to a small but growing literature that uses incentivized survey and lab designs to measure self-censorship directly. Bursztyn et al. (2020b) show experimentally that learning a stigmatized view is locally popular raises people's willingness to state it publicly while leaving their private view unchanged—evidence that silence responds to the perceived audience rather than to genuine persuasion. Braghieri (2024) finds a similar public-private gap among undergraduates asked about sensitive campus topics under randomized anonymity, with the gap concentrated among politically conservative respondents and largely absent for placebo questions. Bursztyn et al. (2023) show that people are more willing to voice a view unpopular within their own political coalition when they can cite a justification for it, consistent with listeners inferring less about a speaker's underlying type when her statement can be attributed to something other than personal conviction. Finally, Ho and Huang (2026) find support for the spiral of silence and note that making silence salient helps to reduce its effects. We build on this literature in three ways: rather than manipulating audience or anonymity experimentally, we measure self-censorship as it occurs naturally, across a broad set of salient topics; rather than inferring the social cost of speaking from the act of self-censoring itself, we elicit each student's tolerance for disagreement directly; and rather than treating the campus as a single environment, we compare self-censorship across topics and audiences within the same individual.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the survey instrument and sample. Section 3 presents descriptive patterns in student ideology on topic views, as well as the views they would like on their ideal campus. Section 4 examines self-censorship by topic and context along with candidate explanations for why they do so. Section 5 reports estimates of the demand for and supply of self-censorship. Section 6 concludes.

2 Survey Methodology

The survey was conducted from February 7 to March 3, 2023. We received 656 submissions, of which 498 met eligibility criteria and were included in our analysis. To qualify, respondents had to be at least 18 years old, currently enrolled as Duke undergraduate students, and provide answers to a minimum number of questions. All students who completed the survey received a 20 dollar gift card, whether or not their responses were included in the final analysis. Additional details of the survey, sample, and weighting procedure are described in Appendix B.

To account for the potential for non-random completion of the survey, we weighted the survey to match the demographic composition of the Duke undergraduate student population, matching our survey sample against institutional data provided by Duke on the race-by-sex-by-class composition of the undergraduate body. This is particularly important in our context because we wished to understand where students sat in the ideological distribution on campus on an issue-by-issue basis, and how this affected choices of whether to self-censor. Our weighting procedure resulted in 80% of survey respondents being given weights between 0.61 and 1.35, suggesting the survey already had good demographic balance. Broadly speaking, use of these weights appears to have minimal effect on our results. Our estimates of the campus population's beliefs are unbiased provided that survey participation was not unrepresentative within each race-sex-class strata.

The first section of the survey included questions on eight political and social topics. The topics include 2020 election fraud (*election*), abortion (*abortion*), Black Lives Matter (*BLM*), gun control (*guns*), the role of the U.S. government (*govt*), puberty blockers for trans-identifying youth (*trans*), free speech on campus (*speech*) and equality versus equity (*equity*).[5] Each topic presented two opposing viewpoints designed to capture opposite ends of the belief spectrum. For each topic, students answered five questions using a scale from 0 to 100—where 0 represented one polar opinion, 100 represented the opposite, and values in between indicated intermediate beliefs.

The five questions elicited the individual's:

1. *own view*: Own belief on the topic
2. *perceived campus mean*: Estimate of the average belief of Duke undergraduate students
3. *ideal campus mean*: Preferred average student belief on a hypothetical ideal campus
4. *lower bound*: Preferred/tolerated extreme low (conservative or right-wing) student belief on the hypothetical ideal campus

[5]The exact questions are given in Appendix B.

5. *upper bound*: Preferred/tolerated extreme high (progressive or left-wing) belief on the hypothetical ideal campus

Throughout, we refer to the gap between these latter two measures, that is the range of views that a student expresses willingness to tolerate on campus, as the student's desired Overton window.

To minimize bias, survey elements were randomized wherever possible. Topics appeared in a random order to ensure equal exposure across participants, and the ideological orientation of the 0-100 scale was randomly varied across topics for each participant. We then performed ex-post renormalization for our analysis so that 0 (100) is the most extreme right-wing (left-wing) view. An information treatment (the results of which are completely separate from the analysis in this paper) was given to each student on 3 topics out of 8, randomly selected; we treat this as providing minor idiosyncratic variation.

3 Student Views and Ideology

In this section we outline the descriptive patterns in the data on a number of fronts. First, we describe the overall political beliefs of Duke students, illustrating the landscape in which controversial topics are discussed. Second, we show these overall beliefs translate into beliefs regarding particular issues as well their perceptions of what the average student at Duke believes on these same issues. Third, we establish patterns on self-censorship, both with regard to particular topics as well as particular contexts (e.g. in the classroom versus outside of Duke), as well as why students report self-censoring. Finally, we examine the range of beliefs that students would like to see on their ideal campus, their Overton windows.

3.1 Ideology

As illustrated in the introduction, the political representation of Duke faculty tilts to the left. In this section, we examine the representation of the students with regard to their political beliefs and left-right ideological identity. Where students sit ideologically may in turn affect which views are considered acceptable and not acceptable.

Table 1 shows the distribution of students across political affiliations by their left-right ideologies. The last column of Table 1 shows the overall representation of political affiliations, ordered from most populous to least (with residual Other/None/Unsure categories shown last), showing that Duke students have very liberal political affiliations. Over 30% of the sample identifies as liberal, with the next most popular category being unsure at 18%. At 10% and

Table 1: Political Affiliation and Left-Right Ideology

	Far Left	Left	Lean Left	Center	Lean Right	Right	Far Right	Total
Political Affiliation								
Liberal	11	87	35	9	5	5	4	156
Progressive	7	28	9	3	1	0	2	50
Socialist	24	14	0	1	0	0	0	39
Social Democrat	5	16	10	1	0	1	0	33
Conservative	0	0	2	5	11	13	2	33
Libertarian	0	0	6	6	14	7	0	33
Communist	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
Anarchist	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	3
Other	1	1	5	2	5	0	0	14
None	0	4	4	11	6	1	0	26
Unsure	3	20	35	12	12	3	1	86
Total	57	170	108	50	55	30	9	479

Notes: Cell entries are the number of respondents. Rows are self-reported political affiliation; columns are self-reported left-right ideological identity. The final column reports the total number of respondents in each political affiliation category, and the final row reports the total number of respondents in each left-right category. Sample is restricted to respondents who answered both questions (N=479).

8% respectively, progressives and socialists represent larger shares than either conservatives or libertarians. Similarly the last row of Table 1 shows the distribution along left-right ideology, with 12% of students identifying as far left and with 70% identifying as the far left, left, or lean left. In contrast, less than 2% identify as far right and just 20% identifying as right-of-center. Turning to how political affiliation translates to left-right ideology, we see what we would expect from particular political parties. For example, all of the communists and 62% of the socialists identify as far left and none of the conservatives or libertarians identify as far left or left.

Table A1 shows how Duke students of different demographics are distributed across left-right ideology. Sharp differences in ideology exist by gender. Over sixty percent of women identify as left, more than double the rate of men and exceeding the combined share of left and lean left for men. Conversely, 14 percent of men identify as right compared to less than 5 percent of women. While men are overall left of center, their political views are more evenly distributed than those of women.

Similar differences are observed in religion and sexuality. Only 25 percent of Christians identify as left, while all other religious affiliations report at least 47 percent, with Atheists highest at 68 percent.

Racial differences are more muted. Hispanic students have the highest share identifying as left, followed by Asian students. Notably, black students are more likely than any other racial group to identify as right and report the lowest combined rate of left and lean left. Black and white students are about equally likely to identify as left, but whites have a larger share in the

lean left category.

3.2 Topic views

We next turn to the beliefs respondents hold on each of the eight topics. Figure 1 shows a box-whisker plot of these views, with the topics ordered based on the average view across respondents. The topic with the most liberal average view is *election*; the topic with the most conservative average view is *equity*.

Figure 1 shows that student opinions vary by topic, but have a general liberal lean. The student body, on average, has distinctly liberal views for five topics - *election* (86), *abortion* (80), *BLM* (75), *guns* (67), and *govt* (64). However, the average view on *trans* (56), while liberal, is fairly moderate (i.e. close to 50). The average view, while also moderate, is closer to the conservative benchmark for two issues: *speech* (45) and *equity* (40). On *speech*, student positions are closer to "any invited speaker should always be allowed on campus regardless of their views" than to "students and faculty should do whatever is necessary to keep guests with dangerous views from speaking." On *equity*, students are closer to "equality of opportunity is the most important aspect of a fair society" than to "equity of outcome is the most important aspect of a fair society."

Despite generally liberal average views, considerable intra-topic variation exists. Topics with high average liberal views, as is the case with *election*, *abortion*, and *BLM*, exhibit narrower response ranges, as mechanical constraints limit variation over 100. In contrast, we see a broad distribution of views for other topics. Of the five least liberal topics, *trans* had the widest range of views, indicating the most disagreement, and *govt* had the tightest range, indicating the least disagreement.

Figure 2 shows views on each of the topics by political ideology. With limited exceptions, those who categorize themselves as more liberal have more liberal average views on every topic. The primary exception is that those who lean right have slightly more conservative views on *trans*, *govt* and *equity*. Further, with the exception of the right where there are few students, the ordering of the most liberal topic view to the most conservative one is either identical to that of the population or within one percentage point of being so.

Table 2 shows that the average view on each of the eight issues, both overall and conditional on a subset of the demographic characteristics; Table A2 shows results conditional on the remaining demographics. The final row of Table 2 shows the overall means by topic, matching those in Figure 1. Gender differences in political views are consistent and pronounced. Men are more conservative than women across all topics, and at least 12 points more conservative on six of the eight topics. The two exceptions are *election* (where there is broad consensus)




Figure 1: Students Own Views Across Topics

Notes: Box-whisker plot of Own View by topic, on the 0–100 scale where 0 is the most conservative/right-wing position and 100 the most progressive/left-wing position. Topics are ordered by the average view across respondents, from most liberal (left) to most conservative (right). Boxes show the 25th–75th percentile (interquartile) range; whiskers show the 10th–90th percentile range; the dot marks the mean.

and *govt* (arguably the least controversial subject).

Stark differences also exist across sexuality and whether the respondent is Christian.[6] On every topic, straight and Christian respondents reported more conservative views than their non-straight and non-Christian counterparts. The differences between straight and non-straight views were especially large on *trans* and *equity*, with gaps of 15-20 points on each. For Christians and non-Christians, the gap was largest for *abortion* at 18 points, followed by *guns* at 15 points.

Based on the correlation between political affiliation and left-right ideology in Table 1, we aggregate political parties into five groups, placing socialists with communists, progressives and social democrats with liberals, and aggregating other, none, unsure, and anarchists, while retaining libertarian and conservative as standalone categories. The parties are sorted according to their average beliefs across the topics. Socialists are most liberal on every issue but *guns*, followed by (liberal, other, libertarian, and conservative respectively. The one significant exception to the ordering is on *govt* where conservatives hold more liberal views than libertarians. The political affiliation gaps are very large; the gap between socialists and conservatives ranges from 33 points (*speech*) to almost 56 points (*BLM*).

For the remaining demographic splits, shown in Table A2, the patterns are less clear. Black and Hispanic students hold the most liberal positions on *BLM* and *equity* but the most conservative positions on *abortion*. International students generally fall within domestic ranges,

[6] A more detailed breakdown of religion is presented in Table A2.




Figure 2: Average Topic Views by Political Ideology

Notes: Each line plots the average Own View by topic (0–100 scale, 0 = most conservative/right-wing, 100 = most progressive/left-wing) for respondents in a given left-right ideology category. Topics are ordered as in Figure 1, from most liberal to most conservative average view.

Table 2: Average Own View by Group

	Election	Abortion	BLM	Guns	Govt	Trans	Speech	Equity	Overall	N
Gender										
Male	82.64	72.31	67.61	59.80	60.08	47.20	35.33	30.90	57.39	207
Female	88.73	86.47	81.53	73.67	67.16	62.18	53.66	46.80	70.14	275
Sexuality										
Straight	83.76	77.01	72.00	65.55	62.50	50.72	42.46	36.26	61.50	377
Non-straight	94.21	89.59	85.10	72.38	69.15	70.80	52.53	50.91	73.51	99
Religion										
Christian	81.05	67.90	72.13	57.07	61.21	49.01	42.46	36.01	58.49	162
Non-Christian	88.73	86.33	77.11	71.90	65.22	59.23	46.21	41.38	67.25	332
Political Affiliation										
Socialist	96.35	95.09	93.72	74.77	81.72	71.79	54.69	59.68	78.99	45
Liberal	91.01	88.14	83.60	75.61	71.84	64.74	50.45	42.80	71.21	244
Other	83.88	75.50	72.26	64.98	56.88	48.37	43.17	36.16	60.29	141
Libertarian	77.56	60.73	46.75	39.20	34.32	34.41	27.90	26.88	43.64	33
Conservative	59.33	47.23	38.05	37.22	43.40	26.74	21.76	21.04	36.85	33
Ideology										
Left	94.67	92.23	87.35	77.44	73.29	69.96	55.14	48.72	75.17	227
Lean Left	86.33	81.05	78.64	70.35	62.05	55.29	44.90	38.92	64.81	108
Center	74.97	72.07	62.59	59.90	59.06	45.68	36.11	30.21	54.86	50
Lean Right	79.46	60.65	54.51	44.66	45.04	27.84	28.47	25.03	45.90	56
Right	63.17	51.80	45.72	42.68	45.47	35.91	26.38	29.47	42.97	39
Total	86.14	80.26	75.37	66.98	63.79	55.82	45.07	39.72	64.36	498

Notes: Own View is measured on a 0–100 scale for each topic, ex-post renormalized so that 0 corresponds to the most extreme conservative/right-wing position and 100 to the most extreme progressive/left-wing position (Section 3.2). Cell entries are group means; *Overall* is each group's mean over all respondent×topic observations; N is the number of respondents in the group.

though they are the most liberal on *guns* and the most conservative on *equity*. Class standing has minimal influence, except on free speech where seniors hold views more than five points more liberal than non-seniors.[7] This is notable because it is the only topic that involves an issue directly related to campus life and could reasonably shift over time based on first-hand experience.

Figure A1 shows kernel density curves of own view distribution in different issues. While strong differences exist in average views across demographic groups, the distributions of six of the eight topic views are unimodal, working against polarization. The two exceptions are *speech* and *equity* with two peaks on either side of 50. Even here, the peaks are not pronounced, especially in the case of *equity*.

3.3 Own Overton Windows

The analysis in section 3.2 focused on the students' views of each of the topics. We now turn to the range of views students would like to have on their ideal campus: the Overton window. Figure 3 shows what the average Overton window looks like for each of the topics as a function of the student's view on that topic. For example, the top line is generated by a local polynomial regression of the students' reports of the most liberal view they would like on their campuses as a function of their own views.

Not surprisingly, the ideal average view as well as the ideal lower and upper bound views are broadly upward-sloping for each of the issues: those who have more conservative views would prefer students on their ideal campus to also have more conservative views. Yet it is also the case that students value differences of opinion as the slope of the ideal average view is less than one.

Figure 3 also shows how the width of the Overton window changes as student views move from conservative to liberal. Conservative views almost always have larger Overton windows than moderate or liberal ones. On five topics, Overton window widths peak at or near the most conservative possible view and narrow as opinions become more liberal. This includes the two topics with conservative average views (*speech* and *equity*). On the other three topics (*election*, *abortion*, and *guns*), the largest Overton windows are held by students with views around 25 (still fairly conservative). On all topics but *abortion*, the most liberal views have the smallest Overton windows.

One reason why conservative views may be associated with larger Overton windows is that

[7] We split on seniors/non-seniors instead of upper-classmen and lower-classmen because of deferral patterns that occurred during COVID. Some who would normally have been part of the junior class chose to defer rather than attend during COVID and these students were more liberal.

their views are so far in the minority. So while their Overton windows may be larger, the share of the population in those windows may be smaller. At the same time, the fact that Overton windows are largest for conservative views even on *equity* where the mean belief on that topic is well below 50 suggests more tolerance for disagreement among conservatives along some dimensions.

4 Self-censorship

We now turn to whether and where students express their views, analyzing share rates by topic and by audience. We then descriptively examine certain explanations for the sharing rate patterns, including the level of importance and confidence the students report on particular topics, whether their views are acceptable to others, and their own stated reasons for self-censoring.

4.1 Rates of self-censorship

4.1.1 Self-censorship by topic

Table 3 shows which demographic groups are censoring on which topics. Here we collapse willingness to share to a binary variable, with one indicating that they always or usually share and zero indicating they sometimes or never share. At least half of the students always or usually share on *abortion*, *guns*, and *equity*; all other topics are at or below forty percent with *trans* the lowest at twenty-one percent.[8]

Which groups share, however, differ substantially by topic. Women are 24 percentage points more likely to share than men on *abortion*. Women are also at least 13 percentage points more likely to share on *BLM*, *guns* and *equity*. Men are more than 10 percentage points more likely to share than women on the role of government and speech, though on no topic do over half of men report always or usually sharing.

Share rates also differ substantially by sexuality and religion. Those who are non-straight share more on all issues except for *govt* and *speech*. Of the six issues where non-straight students share more, only *election* has a gap smaller than eleven percentage points. Non-Christians are substantially more likely to share than Christians on *abortion*, *guns*, and *trans* with gaps between 9 and 20 percentage points. These are also the topics where the differences in views between non-Christians and Christians are the largest, with non-Christians having views that are at least 10 percentage points more liberal.

[8]Figure A2 shows the share frequency distribution on the topics using the more granular sharing scale.




Figure 3: Overton Window Shape Over Own View

Notes: Each topic panel plots local polynomial regressions of respondents' Overton window bounds and preferred mean view against their Own View, measured on the 0–100 scale (0 = most right-wing, 100 = most left-wing). OW Top and OW Bottom are the respondent's preferred extreme high and low beliefs on an ideal campus; Preferred Mean View is similarly the preferred average student belief; OW Width := OW Top - OW Bottom.

Notably, groups that are perceived to be marginalized actually share more and especially so on topics where their views are most liberal relative to their counterparts and on issues that may be especially salient to the group. This can also be seen in Table A3 which shows that black students share their views on *BLM* and *equity* 31 and 19 percentage points more than their white counterparts, issues where their topic views are 14 and 12 percentage points more liberal.

The results so far suggest that more conservative views are more likely to be self-censored. The last two panels of Table 3 on political affiliation and left-right ideology suggest that this is only partially the case. Socialists share more than liberals on every topic and conservatives share at least as much as libertarians on every topic. Similar patterns are seen on left-right ideology, with those on the left sharing more on every topic than those who lean left and also those on the right sharing more on every topic than those who lean right.[9] Additionally, it is those who lean right who share the least on every issue except *speech*, though these students are indeed quite conservative relative to the Duke population: of those who expressed a left-right ideology, 70% were left or lean left and 80% were left, lean left, or center.

A more direct test of whether conservative views on particular topics are self-censored is to examine the relationship between topic views and sharing rates. Figure 4 shows the relationships between topic views and sharing rates. With the exception of *speech*, those with the most liberal views share the most. Note that this even holds for *equity* which has an average view of less than fifty. At the same time, most of the topics also display a J pattern, with the most conservative views also sharing at the higher rates than those immediately to the right of them. Note that these patterns work against an Overton window story for self-censorship: those at the extremes will mechanically be outside more Overton windows, implying those at the extremes should self-censor the most.

4.1.2 Self-censorship by environment

The previous section explored patterns within students' willingness to share across topics. Here we turn to willingness to share their beliefs in particular environments.[10] Table 4 shows willingness to share in different environments, both overall and across different demographics.[11] Moving from left to right shows results for the most Duke-connected environment (the classroom) to the least Duke-connected environment (off campus with non-Duke students). Overall,

[9] The exception is government, where lean left shares more than left.

[10] The question used is *Given the opportunity, how often, if at all, do you share your political and social opinions in each of the following contexts?* which is answered for the following environments i) classroom, ii) on campus, outside of the classroom, iii) off campus, with other Duke students, iv) off campus, with people that are not Duke students.

[11] See Table A4 for additional demographics.




Figure 4: Share Frequency Over Own View

Notes: Each panel is a binned scatterplot, for one topic, of the binary share-frequency measure from Table 3 (1 = usually or always share, 0 = never or sometimes share) against Own View (0–100 scale, 0 = most conservative/right-wing, 100 = most progressive/left-wing), with a fitted quadratic overlaid.

Table 3: Share Frequency Across Topics

	Election	Abortion	BLM	Guns	Govt	Trans	Speech	Equity	Overall	N
Gender										
Male	0.32	0.37	0.32	0.48	0.39	0.20	0.40	0.46	0.37	207
Female	0.24	0.61	0.47	0.62	0.20	0.19	0.24	0.59	0.39	275
Sexuality										
Straight	0.27	0.46	0.36	0.52	0.31	0.16	0.33	0.51	0.37	377
Non-straight	0.30	0.68	0.55	0.68	0.19	0.35	0.28	0.62	0.46	99
Religion										
Christian	0.28	0.37	0.42	0.47	0.34	0.15	0.35	0.52	0.36	162
Non-Christian	0.27	0.57	0.40	0.59	0.26	0.24	0.31	0.53	0.40	332
Political Affiliation										
Socialist	0.36	0.76	0.62	0.74	0.42	0.41	0.39	0.79	0.56	45
Liberal	0.33	0.60	0.49	0.65	0.28	0.22	0.32	0.63	0.44	244
Other	0.18	0.37	0.29	0.41	0.21	0.15	0.23	0.40	0.28	141
Libertarian	0.12	0.24	0.21	0.28	0.34	0.09	0.37	0.21	0.23	33
Conservative	0.31	0.35	0.21	0.47	0.43	0.24	0.54	0.37	0.36	33
Ideology										
Left	0.33	0.66	0.52	0.67	0.24	0.24	0.29	0.65	0.45	227
Lean Left	0.25	0.50	0.35	0.56	0.31	0.16	0.28	0.50	0.36	108
Center	0.27	0.39	0.27	0.47	0.35	0.20	0.33	0.36	0.33	50
Lean Right	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.21	0.23	0.06	0.32	0.27	0.19	56
Right	0.37	0.43	0.45	0.56	0.56	0.43	0.57	0.46	0.48	39
Total	0.28	0.51	0.40	0.55	0.29	0.21	0.32	0.53	0.39	498

Notes: The frequency is collapsed to a binary indicator: 0 = Never Share / Sometimes Share; 1 = Usually Share / Always Share–cells report the proportion of respondents who usually or always share.

students are least likely to share in the classroom, followed by sharing off campus with those who are not Duke students. The most sharing occurs with Duke students either on or off campus.[12]

There are, however, sharp differences across demographics. Men are much less likely to share both in the classroom and with Duke students than women, yet more likely to share when off campus with those who are not Duke students. Similar patterns hold for sexuality and religion, with those who are straight or Christian sharing less in the classroom and among Duke students yet sharing more or similar amounts among non-Duke students.

Like what was seen in the relationship between share rates and political affiliation or left-right ideology, it is those in the middle or lean-to-the-right who share the least in the classroom and among Duke students. But the patterns are markedly different outside of the classroom. Socialists and those who identify as left have the highest rates of sharing in the classroom and among Duke students, yet these are the only two groups to share less with non-Duke students than they do in the classroom—all other political affiliations and left-right ideologies share more with non-Duke students than in the classroom.

[12]Figure A3 shows the share frequency in different contexts using the more granular sharing measure.

The patterns are especially stark for those who lean right. At only 12 percent, their sharing rates in classrooms are just over a quarter that of those on the left. Yet off campus, those who lean right share seven percentage points more than those on the left (49 versus 42). The results overall suggest that liberal students significantly more comfortable sharing in Duke environments rather than non-Duke environments when compared to conservative students.

Table 4: Share Environment

	On-campus In Classroom	On-campus Outside Classroom	Off-campus Duke Students	Off-campus non-Duke Students	N
Gender					
Male	0.28	0.47	0.47	0.47	207
Female	0.39	0.60	0.56	0.43	275
Sexuality					
Straight	0.31	0.49	0.47	0.47	377
Non-straight	0.43	0.76	0.73	0.43	99
Religion					
Christian	0.30	0.42	0.43	0.45	162
Non-Christian	0.36	0.61	0.58	0.45	332
Political Affiliation					
Socialist	0.63	0.72	0.74	0.57	45
Liberal	0.43	0.65	0.57	0.43	244
Other	0.18	0.38	0.43	0.37	141
Libertarian	0.11	0.31	0.44	0.50	33
Conservative	0.19	0.46	0.42	0.68	33
Ideology					
Left	0.46	0.68	0.63	0.42	227
Lean Left	0.26	0.56	0.54	0.44	108
Center	0.19	0.30	0.25	0.34	50
Lean Right	0.12	0.25	0.31	0.49	56
Right	0.44	0.50	0.53	0.73	39
Total	0.34	0.54	0.53	0.45	498

Notes: Share is converted to a binary scale: 0 = Never Share / Sometimes Share, 1 = Usually Share / Always Share. Columns move left to right from the most Duke-connected locale (in the classroom) to the least Duke-connected (off campus, with non-Duke students).

4.2 Rationalizing self-censorship

4.2.1 Topic importance and confidence

Differences in sharing rates across demographics may reflect differences in how important a topic is to respondents as well as how confident they are in their positions. Tables 5 and 6 show binary rates of importance and confidence for each topic broken out by demographics. The four topics where women were substantially more likely to share than men (*abortion*, *BLM*, *guns*, *equity*) are also the topics that women view as significantly more important than men. These

are also the issues where, relative to men, they are most confident. On sexuality, those who are non-straight place higher importance and more confidence in their opinions than their straight counterparts on *abortion*, *BLM*, and *trans*, which are the three issues with the largest gaps in sharing rates across sexuality. Tables A6 and A7 show that black students view *BLM* and *equity* as more important than other issues and these are the issues where they feel especially comfortable sharing and are most confident in their opinions.

The results on political affiliation and ideology show why *speech* was the issue where more conservative views share more. As respondents become more conservative–either based on political affiliation or left-right ideology–the importance of free speech increases as does confidence in their position. Many of the other issues show a U-shaped pattern, especially with regard to confidence. With the exception of free speech and government, those who identify as left are more confident in their positions than those who lean left, and those who identify as right are always at least as confident as those who lean right.

Figure 5 shows how changes in share frequency, importance and confidence are correlated with own views. The J-shaped patterns in the relationship between own views and sharing often corresponds to a U-shaped pattern for importance and confidence: those at both ends of the own view distribution on a particular topic also hold that topic as more important and are more confident in their opinions than those in the middle. *Abortion* provides a good example. Those on either end of the distribution see the topic as similarly important and are similarly confident in their opinions, much more so than those in the middle of the distribution. But those who hold the liberal extreme share significantly more than those who hold the conservative extreme.

There are a few counterexamples. While those who hold very conservative views are confident in their opinions regarding *BLM*, as views become more liberal the importance of the issue generally increases. In contrast, views on the importance of *election* and *speech* fall monotonically as student views become more liberal, with confidence in their view also falling for *speech*.

Taken together, the patterns on topic importance and confidence–coupled with some conservative self-censorship–may account for the generally J-shaped pattern of share rates as a function of own view. And it may also account for the exception to the pattern which was *speech* where sharing rates fell as students' views on *speech* became more liberal. Namely, importance of the issue and confidence in their opinions also fell as views became more liberal.

4.2.2 Overton Windows of Others

Another reason why students may self-censor is due to it being costly to express views that are unwanted by their peers. Table 7 shows the average share of Overton windows that different




Figure 5: Share Frequency, Importance and Confidence Over Own View

Notes: Each panel plots, for one topic, local polynomial regressions of the binary share-frequency, importance, and confidence measures (left axis) against Own View (0–100 scale, 0 = most conservative/right-wing, 100 = most progressive/left-wing). Bars (right axis) show the fraction of respondents at each value of Own View.

Table 5: Topic Importance

	Election	Abortion	BLM	Guns	Govt	Trans	Speech	Equity	Overall	N
Gender										
Male	0.30	0.61	0.42	0.64	0.51	0.26	0.53	0.69	0.49	207
Female	0.20	0.89	0.73	0.83	0.36	0.26	0.38	0.79	0.56	275
Sexuality										
Straight	0.28	0.73	0.55	0.72	0.45	0.24	0.47	0.73	0.52	377
Non-straight	0.15	0.86	0.72	0.74	0.34	0.38	0.33	0.79	0.54	99
Religion										
Christian	0.31	0.66	0.61	0.71	0.51	0.26	0.53	0.79	0.55	162
Non-Christian	0.21	0.81	0.58	0.75	0.39	0.28	0.40	0.72	0.52	332
Political Affiliation										
Socialist	0.05	0.94	0.87	0.88	0.54	0.42	0.27	0.87	0.61	45
Liberal	0.32	0.89	0.72	0.85	0.41	0.28	0.41	0.82	0.59	244
Other	0.14	0.59	0.45	0.60	0.32	0.20	0.42	0.66	0.42	141
Libertarian	0.21	0.40	0.15	0.43	0.62	0.10	0.65	0.50	0.38	33
Conservative	0.39	0.63	0.35	0.57	0.65	0.46	0.77	0.67	0.56	33
Ideology										
Left	0.21	0.90	0.76	0.85	0.34	0.30	0.31	0.82	0.56	227
Lean Left	0.20	0.79	0.55	0.69	0.39	0.13	0.43	0.67	0.48	108
Center	0.38	0.55	0.44	0.69	0.46	0.35	0.57	0.69	0.52	50
Lean Right	0.19	0.46	0.27	0.48	0.57	0.25	0.63	0.66	0.44	56
Right	0.44	0.68	0.47	0.67	0.76	0.49	0.78	0.68	0.62	39
Total	0.24	0.76	0.59	0.73	0.43	0.27	0.44	0.75	0.53	498

Notes: Cell entries are the share of respondents in each demographic group who rate the topic as very or extremely important to them, converted to a binary indicator analogous to the share-frequency measure in Table 3.

demographic groups fall within. It is created by first calculating the Overton windows for every student on every topic. We then calculate the share of Overton windows each individual is in on a given topic, weighting the windows to be representative of the student population.

As a whole, Overton windows are wide, providing coverage for many students' views. At the same time, men, those who are straight, and those who are Christian are in fewer Overton windows on every topic.[13] Conservatives and libertarians are in fewer Overton windows than socialists on every issue, including equity which has an average belief lower than 40. And those who ideologically identify as right are in at least 10 percentage point fewer Overton windows on every issue than those on the left.

4.2.3 Stated reasons

We now turn to student reports on why they self-censor. The respondents were given a number of reasons to choose from—primarily on the costs of sharing their views—and asked to check

[13]The one exception is equity, where straight and non-straight respondents are in an equal proportion of Overton windows.

Table 6: Topic Confidence

	Election	Abortion	BLM	Guns	Govt	Trans	Speech	Equity	Overall	N
Gender										
Male	0.52	0.61	0.43	0.63	0.44	0.33	0.54	0.61	0.51	207
Female	0.39	0.80	0.53	0.63	0.22	0.26	0.32	0.53	0.46	275
Sexuality										
Straight	0.46	0.69	0.47	0.64	0.34	0.28	0.48	0.56	0.49	377
Non-straight	0.43	0.77	0.58	0.58	0.26	0.40	0.24	0.58	0.48	99
Religion										
Christian	0.48	0.69	0.52	0.62	0.42	0.29	0.53	0.60	0.52	162
Non-Christian	0.44	0.72	0.47	0.62	0.27	0.31	0.37	0.55	0.47	332
Political Affiliation										
Socialist	0.56	0.89	0.70	0.74	0.32	0.37	0.35	0.73	0.58	45
Liberal	0.53	0.80	0.53	0.67	0.28	0.28	0.37	0.55	0.50	244
Other	0.30	0.60	0.36	0.49	0.26	0.28	0.39	0.50	0.40	141
Libertarian	0.40	0.43	0.40	0.53	0.57	0.25	0.67	0.58	0.48	33
Conservative	0.44	0.64	0.50	0.78	0.54	0.48	0.74	0.68	0.60	33
Ideology										
Left	0.51	0.80	0.57	0.64	0.22	0.27	0.28	0.54	0.48	227
Lean Left	0.44	0.74	0.39	0.58	0.30	0.24	0.41	0.54	0.46	108
Center	0.35	0.57	0.40	0.53	0.35	0.39	0.48	0.54	0.45	50
Lean Right	0.45	0.51	0.35	0.57	0.50	0.33	0.66	0.63	0.50	56
Right	0.46	0.71	0.72	0.85	0.60	0.53	0.79	0.63	0.66	39
Total	0.45	0.71	0.49	0.62	0.32	0.30	0.42	0.56	0.48	498

Notes: Cell entries are the share of respondents in each demographic group who report being very or extremely confident in their opinion on the topic, converted to a binary indicator analogous to the share-frequency measure in Table 3.

all the reasons that applied. Figure A4 displays the fraction of times each reason was chosen. Reasons are ordered according to the extent to which they are external threats or internal threats: fear of isolation or exclusion on one end of the spectrum and lack of confidence in your opinion on the other. Being misinterpreted was most prominent with 72% reporting this as a reason for self-censorship; fear of isolation or exclusion ranked last at 33%.

Table 8 shows substantial differences between demographics on why students self-censor. Women were substantially more likely than men to self-censor due to nervousness (74% versus 49%) or lack of confidence in their opinions (51% versus 27%), while men were more likely to self-censor due to fear of isolation or exclusion (38% versus 28%).

These same patterns appear within sexuality and religion. Straight and Christian students are at least 7 percentage points more like to self-censor for fear of exclusion. Yet nervousness regarding not accurately characterizing their opinion or lack of confidence in that opinion are the same (within 1pp) or higher for non-straight or those who are non-Christian. Table A8 shows that black respondents reported slightly higher rates of self-censorship to the population due to nervousness of not accurately characterizing their opinion, but *lower* rates for each of the other reasons, suggesting Duke's climate—at least in terms of comfort of sharing their views—is

Table 7: Overton Windows In by Topic and Demographics

	Election	Abortion	BLM	Guns	Govt	Trans	Speech	Equity	Overall	N
Gender										
Male	0.63	0.62	0.62	0.65	0.72	0.55	0.61	0.65	0.63	207
Female	0.68	0.66	0.66	0.70	0.76	0.62	0.63	0.67	0.67	275
Sexuality										
Straight	0.64	0.63	0.64	0.67	0.74	0.58	0.61	0.66	0.65	377
Non-straight	0.73	0.66	0.67	0.70	0.77	0.59	0.66	0.66	0.68	99
Religion										
Christian	0.62	0.59	0.62	0.64	0.69	0.57	0.61	0.65	0.62	162
Non-Christian	0.68	0.67	0.66	0.69	0.77	0.58	0.63	0.67	0.67	332
Political Affiliation										
Socialist	0.75	0.69	0.66	0.66	0.70	0.58	0.61	0.63	0.66	45
Liberal	0.70	0.67	0.68	0.72	0.77	0.61	0.65	0.68	0.68	244
Other	0.63	0.64	0.69	0.68	0.78	0.58	0.62	0.67	0.66	141
Libertarian	0.58	0.58	0.51	0.57	0.66	0.57	0.55	0.62	0.58	33
Conservative	0.45	0.48	0.41	0.52	0.59	0.37	0.52	0.60	0.49	33
Ideology										
Left	0.73	0.68	0.68	0.70	0.77	0.61	0.65	0.68	0.69	227
Lean Left	0.66	0.65	0.71	0.73	0.79	0.63	0.62	0.69	0.68	108
Center	0.55	0.64	0.61	0.66	0.74	0.57	0.64	0.64	0.63	50
Lean Right	0.60	0.60	0.57	0.59	0.71	0.48	0.56	0.62	0.59	56
Right	0.47	0.50	0.41	0.55	0.53	0.47	0.53	0.57	0.50	39
Total	0.66	0.64	0.65	0.68	0.74	0.58	0.62	0.66	0.65	498

Notes: For each respondent-topic pair, we calculate the weighted share of all other respondents' Overton windows (their preferred/tolerated range of views on their ideal campus, Section 2) that contain the respondent's own view. Cell entries are the average of this share within each demographic group and topic.

actually quite good for black students relative to the population. Indeed, black respondents reported lower rates relative to white respondents on every reason for self-censorship.

The reasons for self-censorship also differ substantially across political affiliation and ideology. Recall that fear of isolation or exclusion was the least-selected reason for the population as a whole. But for those students who identify ideologically as right, 66% selected this reason, over three times the rate of those who identify ideologically as left (20%), with a similar pattern seen when comparing socialists to conservatives. Students on the right are also much more likely to self-censor because of beliefs that their opinions would not be viewed as valid by others or that their opinions are not wanted, yet are substantially less likely to self-censor due to nervousness or lack of confidence in their opinions. Indeed, those on the left (or alternatively socialist) are more than three times as likely to self-censor due to lack of confidence in their opinions than those on the right (conservative).

Respondents were also asked an open-ended question on other reasons they would self-censor. The pattern of responses, shown in Appendix C, again highlights social anxiety as a feature of self-censorship on the left, with concerns over being canceled or suffering other external

consequences as driving right/lean right self-censorship.

Table 8: Share of Censorship Reasons

	Exclusion	Judgement	Criticism	Opinion Invalid	Opinion Unwanted	Misinterpreted	Mischaracterize Self	Lack Confidence	N
Gender									
Male	0.38	0.63	0.38	0.34	0.38	0.70	0.49	0.27	207
Female	0.28	0.55	0.43	0.40	0.30	0.73	0.74	0.51	275
Sexuality									
Straight	0.34	0.62	0.43	0.39	0.32	0.74	0.59	0.40	377
Non-straight	0.26	0.54	0.36	0.33	0.44	0.68	0.75	0.40	99
Religion									
Christian	0.37	0.64	0.49	0.41	0.36	0.70	0.63	0.34	162
Non-Christian	0.30	0.56	0.36	0.36	0.34	0.73	0.62	0.43	332
Political Affiliation									
Socialist	0.21	0.35	0.25	0.29	0.27	0.70	0.60	0.30	45
Liberal	0.24	0.57	0.40	0.34	0.32	0.71	0.70	0.49	244
Other	0.35	0.64	0.41	0.38	0.35	0.73	0.61	0.39	141
Libertarian	0.68	0.75	0.40	0.53	0.44	0.81	0.49	0.26	33
Conservative	0.60	0.66	0.59	0.57	0.49	0.64	0.41	0.09	33
Ideology									
Left	0.20	0.51	0.37	0.33	0.32	0.69	0.74	0.48	227
Lean Left	0.27	0.67	0.42	0.37	0.32	0.77	0.64	0.44	108
Center	0.55	0.65	0.55	0.33	0.37	0.70	0.58	0.31	50
Lean Right	0.48	0.68	0.44	0.55	0.41	0.78	0.40	0.26	56
Right	0.66	0.60	0.45	0.48	0.49	0.75	0.44	0.15	39
Total	0.33	0.59	0.41	0.38	0.34	0.72	0.63	0.40	498

Notes: Cell entries are the share of respondents in each demographic group who selected the given reason as a reason they self-censor. Respondents could select multiple reasons, so rows need not sum to 100 percent. Column headers are abbreviated as follows:
Exclusion: Fear of isolation or exclusion
Judgement: Fear of judgement because of your opinion
Criticism: Fear of criticism of the opinion
Opinion Invalid: A belief that your opinion will not be viewed as valid by others
Opinion Unwanted: A belief that your opinion is not wanted
Misinterpreted: Fear of being misinterpreted
Mischaracterize Self: Nervousness that you won't accurately characterize your opinion
Lack Confidence: Lack of confidence in your opinion

4.3 Self-censorship and view exposure

4.3.1 Public and private views

Due to differential rates of self-censorship, the distribution of those who speak publicly on an issue or in an environment may differ from the distribution in the population. We begin by examining the distribution of those who share on each of the eight topics to see how representative they are relative to the population of Duke students.

Results are presented in Table 9, with additional demographics in Table A9. On no issue are either men or women more than 65% of the speakers, though on two issues women represent more than 60% of speakers (*abortion* and *BLM*) and on two issues men are at least 60%

of speakers (*govt* and *speech*). On all issues but one the representation of speakers who are straight and non-straight are within 8% of their population shares. The one exception is *trans* where non-straight are 38% of speakers, 17 percentage points above their population share. On religion, the gap is largest for *trans* with non-Christian representation among speakers 10 percentage points above their population share.

Turning to left-right ideology, it is those who lean right who are particularly under-represented among public speakers, being at or below their representation on every topic. Those who lean right have public speech shares that are less than half of their population shares on four of the issues (*abortion*, *BLM*, *guns*, and *trans*). Those on the right represent a greater share of speakers than those who lean right on every issue despite having a lower population share (9% versus 12%). Polarization is present on some issues, such as *trans*, where those whose beliefs are most to the left or most to the right are most represented in speech relative to their population shares. But as the share of those on the right is much smaller than those on the left, speech itself tilts heavily to the left.

Differences in exposure to various constituencies are also present across different contexts. Table 10 shows that the classroom in some respects is tilted even more liberal than any of the topics.[14] Those on the left represent 62% of public views in the classroom which is greater than their share on any of the topics. Socialists are also more represented among public views in the classroom than on any topic besides *trans*, while conservatives are less represented in the classroom on all issues besides *BLM*. Those who lean right are again especially underrepresented in the classroom, representing 4% of public views despite being 12% of the population.

These results stand in stark contrast to what we see in the second to last column of Table 10. The distribution of public views looks much like that of the population and if anything now tilts to the right. Those on the left now represent 42% of public views, 4 percentage points less than their population share. Those who lean right are now over-represented among shared views at 14%, suggesting that the reason they were not expressing their views in the classroom was not because they did not want to share their views more generally, but that they did not want to share their views in that environment.

4.3.2 Public topic views and perceived average views

The heterogeneity in who shares their views and who does not results in differences between public views and private views on each of the topics. Figure 6 shows the distribution of private and public views by topic, as well as the means of each. With the exception of *speech*, on each topic the average public view is more liberal than the average private view and those with the

[14] Results for additional demographics are in Table A10.

most extreme liberal views are also over-represented relative to their population shares among public views. For *trans*, the gap between public and private views is especially large at 15 percentage points. And the gaps between public views and private unshared views are between 14 and 20 percentage points for *abortion*, *BLM*, *guns*, and *trans*.

Given the difference in public versus population views especially on particular topics, we might expect that Duke students perceive the population to be more liberal than it actually is, which in turn leads to more conservative self-censoring. Table 11 shows what students believe the average view in the Duke population to be, with additional demographics shown in Table A11. Comparing beliefs of the student population regarding the average views on each of the topics to the actual average views as calculated in Table 2 shows that perceived average beliefs on *trans* are more liberal than they actually are by over eight percentage points, which would be consistent with students forming their expectations of Duke student beliefs based on what students share.

Yet *trans* turns out to be an exception. Where students are most off on their beliefs is *speech*, believing that Duke students are almost ten percentage points more liberal than was reported in Table 2 despite *speech* being the one topic where public views are (slightly) more conservative than the population. And students also believe the Duke population has more conservative views on abortion than what is shown in the population even though public views are significantly more liberal than private views on this topic.

Indeed, the demographic breakdown of perceived mean views shows surprising heterogeneity. Namely, the more conservative a particular demographic is on a topic, the more the perceived mean on that topic is liberal, a result consistent with Ahler and Sood (2018) who show that people perceive those in other political parties as more extreme than they actually are. Recall that men, those who are straight, and Christians were more conservative on every topic than their counterparts. Yet with few exceptions, their beliefs about the average Duke student are more liberal; the opposite would be expected if their beliefs overweighted people like themselves.[15] Turning to ideology, there are some topics that show little correlation with left-right identity. Yet on *govt* and *equity* the gap between left and right in perceived mean views of Duke students is over 10 percentage points, again with those on the right believing Duke students are more liberal than those on the left.

[15]There are no exceptions for men and women. For straight/not and Christian/non-Christian, *election* is an exception, as is *equity* for Christian/non-Christian.




Figure 6: Public and Private Views

Notes: Each panel shows, for one topic, the distribution of Own View (0–100 scale, 0 = most conservative/right-wing, 100 = most progressive/left-wing) among all respondents (Own View) versus among respondents classified as public speakers on that topic (Public Views, i.e., those who usually or always share their view, per Table 3). Dashed lines mark the mean of each distribution.

Table 9: Public Speakers by Topic

	Election	Abortion	BLM	Guns	Govt	Trans	Speech	Equity	Sample
Gender									
Male	0.55	0.36	0.39	0.42	0.65	0.49	0.60	0.42	0.48
Female	0.45	0.64	0.61	0.58	0.35	0.51	0.40	0.58	0.52
Sexuality									
Straight	0.77	0.71	0.71	0.74	0.86	0.62	0.81	0.75	0.79
Non-straight	0.23	0.29	0.29	0.26	0.14	0.38	0.19	0.25	0.21
Religion									
Christian	0.34	0.25	0.35	0.29	0.40	0.24	0.36	0.33	0.34
Non-Christian	0.66	0.75	0.65	0.71	0.60	0.76	0.64	0.67	0.66
Political Affiliation									
Socialist	0.12	0.13	0.13	0.12	0.13	0.17	0.11	0.13	0.09
Liberal	0.60	0.59	0.60	0.58	0.48	0.52	0.49	0.59	0.50
Other	0.17	0.20	0.19	0.20	0.19	0.20	0.19	0.20	0.27
Libertarian	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.09	0.03	0.09	0.03	0.08
Conservative	0.08	0.05	0.04	0.06	0.11	0.08	0.12	0.05	0.07
Ideology									
Left	0.53	0.59	0.59	0.55	0.37	0.52	0.42	0.57	0.46
Lean Left	0.20	0.23	0.20	0.23	0.25	0.18	0.20	0.22	0.23
Center	0.09	0.07	0.06	0.08	0.12	0.09	0.10	0.07	0.10
Lean Right	0.07	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.10	0.04	0.12	0.06	0.12
Right	0.11	0.07	0.09	0.09	0.16	0.17	0.15	0.08	0.09
N	136	262	207	279	142	101	157	272	498

Notes: A respondent is classified as a public speaker on a topic if they are coded as usually or always sharing their view on that topic (the binary measure in Table 3). Cell entries are the share of public speakers on each topic accounted for by each demographic category; within a demographic split, columns sum to one. The *Sample* column reports each group's share of the estimation sample for comparison, and *Observations* reports the number of public speakers on each topic.

5 Empirical Framework and Results

We organize the analysis around two questions. The *demand* side asks how broad a range of expressed views each respondent wants others to be able to hold — the width of an individual's preferred Overton window. The *supply* side asks how often respondents actually share their own views, conditional on the alignment between those views and the preferred ranges of others.

5.1 Demand: Overton Window Width

The width of respondent i's preferred Overton window for topic t, OW_{it}, measures their preferences over the range of expressed views they would ideally be exposed to. A narrow window indicates a preference for homogeneous discourse; a wide window indicates tolerance for diverse views. In this section we examine what drives Overton window width, paying particular attention to whether liberal or conservative views on a topic are associated with narrower Overton

Table 10: Public Speakers by Environment

	On-campus In Classroom	On-campus Outside Classroom	Off-campus Duke Students	Off-campus non-Duke Students	Sample
Gender					
Male	0.40	0.42	0.43	0.50	0.48
Female	0.60	0.58	0.57	0.50	0.52
Sexuality					
Straight	0.73	0.70	0.70	0.80	0.79
Non-straight	0.27	0.30	0.30	0.20	0.21
Religion					
Christian	0.30	0.26	0.28	0.33	0.34
Non-Christian	0.70	0.74	0.72	0.67	0.66
Political Affiliation					
Socialist	0.16	0.12	0.12	0.11	0.09
Liberal	0.63	0.59	0.54	0.47	0.50
Other	0.14	0.19	0.22	0.22	0.27
Libertarian	0.02	0.04	0.06	0.08	0.08
Conservative	0.04	0.06	0.06	0.11	0.07
Ideology					
Left	0.62	0.57	0.55	0.42	0.46
Lean Left	0.18	0.24	0.24	0.23	0.23
Center	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.10
Lean Right	0.04	0.06	0.07	0.14	0.12
Right	0.11	0.08	0.09	0.14	0.09
N	173	271	263	226	498

Notes: A respondent is classified as a public speaker in a setting if they are coded as usually or always sharing their views there (the binary measure in Table 4). Cell entries are the share of public speakers in each setting accounted for by each demographic category; within a demographic split, columns sum to one. *Sample* reports each group's share of the estimation sample for comparison, and *Observations* reports the number of public speakers in each setting.

windows. In particular, we regress OW_{it} on i's views on topic t, OV_{it}, their perception of average student views on that topic, PAV_{it}, and a set of controls X_{it}:

$$OW_{it} = OV_{it}\alpha_1 + PAV_{it}\alpha_2 + X_{it}\alpha_3 + \epsilon_{it} \tag{1}$$

Embedded in X_{it} are demographics such as race, gender, sexuality, and religion as well as topic fixed effects. Since views are restricted to be between 0 and 100, there is a concern regarding truncation. Namely, for someone to have an Overton window width of 50, that person could be accommodating of views within 25 points of their own in either direction. In contrast, a person with a view of 100 could only have a width of 50 by accommodating views 50 points below their own. To account for this truncation, we also include in X_{it} the absolute value of the difference between one's own views and 50. As those with especially extreme views on a topic (0 or 100) might have especially strong perceptions of what is acceptable discourse on a topic, we also include separate indicator variables for those views. Both of these adjustments

Table 11: Average Perceived Mean View by Group

	Election	Abortion	BLM	Guns	Govt	Trans	Speech	Equity	Overall	N
Gender										
Male	82.44	77.63	77.06	68.65	70.73	66.14	56.51	49.94	68.80	207
Female	80.45	72.84	73.58	62.65	64.32	62.58	53.51	47.19	64.61	275
Sexuality										
Straight	80.77	76.39	75.52	66.13	67.71	64.93	55.86	48.92	67.09	377
Non-straight	84.41	70.63	74.00	63.68	65.66	61.33	53.26	46.78	64.92	99
Religion										
Christian	79.49	76.22	76.40	66.66	71.09	66.23	55.97	47.88	67.53	162
Non-Christian	82.50	74.46	74.72	64.80	65.29	63.17	54.39	48.23	66.01	332
Political Affiliation										
Socialist	85.37	75.05	76.20	62.28	62.39	61.29	47.30	39.45	64.29	45
Liberal	81.02	74.54	74.65	64.61	66.51	64.24	55.12	46.19	65.94	244
Other	80.60	76.32	75.34	63.89	66.70	63.60	53.82	49.45	66.04	141
Libertarian	81.95	72.95	75.86	70.68	67.79	62.56	61.30	57.16	69.11	33
Conservative	81.71	77.18	77.85	74.62	79.27	71.05	60.87	57.33	72.49	33
Ideology										
Left	83.38	73.77	74.53	62.21	63.21	62.57	54.35	43.27	64.81	227
Lean Left	80.92	75.45	76.32	67.65	67.35	65.05	54.65	50.06	67.18	108
Center	78.01	78.44	72.69	66.56	71.71	64.58	49.80	50.74	66.69	50
Lean Right	83.02	77.03	78.80	73.16	71.22	67.42	59.35	55.40	70.71	56
Right	75.81	73.60	75.81	67.22	74.81	66.46	60.19	55.40	68.86	39
Total	81.43	75.02	75.22	65.40	67.21	64.12	54.95	48.18	66.49	498

Notes: Cell entries are each group's average belief about the mean view of the overall Duke undergraduate student body on each topic (Section 3.2), measured on the same 0–100 scale as Own View in Table 2, where 0 is the most conservative/right-wing position and 100 the most progressive/left-wing position. *Overall* is each group's mean perceived belief over all respondent×topic observations; N is the number of respondents in the group.

allow us to separate out the effects of topic-specific belief direction (as measured by own view) on the width of respondents' Overton windows, separate from the extremeness of views itself.

Column (1) of Table 12 shows results for some of the coefficients of this baseline specification with the full set of results given in Table A12. More liberal views are associated with narrower Overton windows. This remains the case when indicator variables for left-right ideology are added to the regression in column (2) and when indicators for the importance of and confidence in their opinion on the topic are added in column (3).

Results in Table A12 reveal that topic confidence plays a strong role in Overton window width: the more confident a person is in their views on a topic, the smaller their Overton window. In contrast, topic importance has no effect. Controlling for topic confidence, while not affecting the coefficient on own view, substantially reduces the magnitude of the estimate on the truncation measure (the distance of own view from 50), rendering it small. This occurs because more extreme views are associated with more confidence in those views and correspondingly smaller Overton windows.

Columns (4) and (5) of Table 12 add the respondent's views on free speech to the specifications in columns (2) and (3).[16] The idea here is that favoring open speech should be associated with more tolerant views in general. And indeed, this is what we find. The more one favors restrictions on free speech, the smaller the Overton window, with an effect that is over twice as large as the direct effect of one's own topic view. Furthermore, accounting for free speech views lowers the coefficient on own view by a third, consistent with students favoring speech restrictions having more liberal views on other topics.

Results in Table A12 also speak to which demographic groups have wider Overton windows after accounting for different sets of controls. Across specifications, wider Overton windows are found for men, white students, and Christians and Jews, with no difference on sexuality.

The last two columns of Table 12 add individual fixed effects to see within a student which topics are associated with narrower Overton windows. We interpret this as a test of whether the higher tolerance of disparate views reported by students with conservative beliefs is consistent across topics, or is situationally specific to the issues on which the student themselves holds conservative (and thus, in context, likely minority) views. The coefficient on own view is still negative but is substantially smaller, meaning Overton windows are modestly narrower on issues where the respondent is relatively more liberal after controlling for view extremism.

A concern with this analysis is that it mixes tolerance over facts versus normative beliefs. This is where *election* stands out as a clear factual claim whereas the other topics are comparatively normative. In Table A13, we report results excluding *election*, showing that the described patterns hold with this exclusion.

5.2 Supply: Share Frequency

The previous section showed that the demand for censorship was higher when students held more liberal positions and this was partly the result of more liberal positions being associated with favoring more restrictions on free speech. The supply side asks how often respondents share their views, with particular attention to how share frequency varies with the alignment between own view and others' Overton windows. A respondent whose view falls outside most others' preferred ranges faces a stronger implicit threat of social sanction for expressing it.

We model the underlying sharing rate for respondent i on topic t, S^*_{it}, as depending on i's own views on topic t, OV_{it}, their perception of average student views on that topic, PAV_{it}, measures of how they do or not do not fit into the Overton windows of others, MOW_{it}, and a

[16] These regressions are run on all topics except *speech*.

Table 12: Overton Window Width Regression

	Overton Window Width						
	Pooled OLS			Excl. Speech		Fixed effects	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Own View	-0.144***	-0.127***	-0.128***	-0.082**	-0.080**	-0.046**	-0.048**
	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Belief of Mean Student View	0.037	0.026	0.032	-0.014	-0.009	-0.030	-0.028
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Absolute Value Own View–50	-0.075	-0.072	-0.002	-0.076	-0.009	-0.165***	-0.117***
	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.035)	(0.036)
Own Free-Speech View				-0.186***	-0.184***		
				(0.038)	(0.036)		
Topic	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Base Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Left-Right Identity	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Importance & Confidence	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Individual FE	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.2445	0.2477	0.2626	0.2805	0.2958	0.2830	0.2941
Observations	3220	3220	3215	2788	2785	3239	3234

Notes: OLS on respondent×topic cells, survey-weighted; $^{*}\,p < 0.10$, $^{**}\,p < 0.05$, $^{***}\,p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses. Columns (4)–(5) drop the *speech* topic. All 0-100 measures are rescaled to 0-1. Dependent variable: width of the respondent's Overton window. *Own View* and *Belief of Mean Student View* from Tables 2 and 11; *Absolute Value Own View–50* is centered and similarly scaled. *Own Free-Speech View*: the respondent's Own View on *speech*, rescaled 0-1 (1 = keep speakers w/ dangerous views off campus). *Topic*: topic indicators. *Base Controls*: indicators for gender, sexuality, race, and religion. *Left-Right Identity*: indicators for the five ideology categories of Table 2. *Importance & Confidence*: indicators for each level of the five-point topic-importance and topic-confidence scales. *Individual FE*: respondent fixed effects. All columns also include indicators for respondents placing Own View at an endpoint of the scale (exactly 0 or exactly 100). Further details in Table A12.

set of controls X_{it}:

$$S^*_{it} = OV_{it}\beta_1 + PAV_{it}\beta_2 + MOW_{it}\beta_3 + X_{it}\beta_4 + \varepsilon_{it} \tag{2}$$

We do not observe S^*_{it} but rather different levels of belief sharing. These different levels of sharing then translate into whether S^*_{it} exceeds certain cut points. With the added assumption that ε_{it} follows an extreme value distribution, estimation follows an ordered logit.

Our baseline set of controls in X_{it} includes the same demographic controls as in the Overton window analysis (gender, race, sexuality, and religion) as well as well as left-right ideology, topic fixed effects, and indicator variables for the stated confidence and importance of each topic. A concern when studying share frequency is that cross-sectional variation in the share of Overton windows a respondent is in is highly correlated with their political beliefs, which in turn have strong relationships with share frequency. Students with different shares of Overton windows they are in may also differ along other dimensions that affect their propensities to share

their beliefs. Accordingly, we also estimate models with individual fixed effects to account for individual-specific propensities to share beliefs, thereby isolating within respondents how share frequency varies across topics where they may be inside more or fewer Overton windows relative to others on the same topics. In this case, we use the method of Baetschmann et al. (2015) which allows us to obtain consistent estimates of the ordered logit parameters when the cutpoints are individual-specific.

Results are presented for a subset of the coefficients in Table 13 with the full set presented in Table A14.[17] Column (1) shows a positive association between having more liberal beliefs and sharing those beliefs. In contrast, there is no significant effect of either beliefs about the average view of Duke students or the share of Overton windows the respondent is in.

That the share of Overton windows the student is in shows up as small and insignificant suggests that it is not the right measure of how social conformity affects belief sharing. That views are more likely to be shared if they are more liberal suggests that social conformity pressures may operate more from the left than from the right, especially given that those who hold more liberal views also favor more restrictions on speech.

Column (2) allows for this asymmetry by controlling separately for the share of Overton windows that the individual is outside of both on the left and on the right. As these two measures together are highly correlated with one's own view, Column (2) removes own view from the regression. A stark asymmetry emerges: being out of Overton windows to the right of one's own view has no effect on belief sharing while being outside of Overton windows to the left of one's view significantly reduces sharing. Another way of framing the same point is in Column (3) where we control for own view as well as being outside of Overton windows to the left of one's own view. The same pattern emerges: the own view coefficient is now small and insignificant with a large (though noisy) negative coefficient on being outside of Overton windows to the left. Given that Overton windows are narrower from those on the left, the sharing patterns correspond closely to an environment analyzed by Genicot (2022). In her framework, the relative lack of tolerance of those on the left results in compromise running in one direction, from conservative to liberal students.

Accounting for individual fixed effects in Columns (4) - (6) makes these patterns starker. Being outside Overton windows to the left as shown in Columns (5) and (6) negatively impacts belief sharing while being outside Overton windows to the right or own view has no effect. Adding individual fixed effects also increases the importance of beliefs about the average view of Duke students, with each of the fixed effects specifications showing negative and significant effects on share frequency of believing the student body to be more left-leaning on the topic

[17]For completeness, we also show results using ordinary least squares which show similar patterns. See Table A15.

in question than one's peers. Perceiving that the student body is more liberal on a particular topic relative to one's peers (which would be captured by the topic fixed effects) would also lead to the perception of being outside of more Overton windows to the left of one's own view, reinforcing the notion that it is the beliefs of those on the left that work to limit belief sharing.

The full results in Table A14 also contribute to why there is often a J-shaped pattern seen in the raw descriptive statistics on sharing. Namely, those who are more confident in their opinions and believe a topic is important are more likely to share and these students have more extreme views. In contrast to the results on Overton window width where only confidence was important, the effects of importance and confidence are similar for belief sharing.

Table 13: Ordered Logits of Sharing Frequency

	Share Frequency					
	Ordered Logit			FE Ordered Logit		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Own View	0.645***		0.126	0.664**		-0.076
	(0.203)		(0.389)	(0.285)		(0.494)
Belief of Mean Student View	-0.284	-0.295	-0.288	-0.668**	-0.674**	-0.678**
	(0.276)	(0.277)	(0.276)	(0.326)	(0.328)	(0.326)
Share of Overton Windows Own View is In	0.337			0.610**		
	(0.256)			(0.303)		
Share of Overton Windows to Right of Own View		0.191			-0.097	
		(0.315)			(0.392)	
Share of Overton Windows to Left of Own View		-0.890***	-0.822		-1.168***	-1.218**
		(0.290)	(0.510)		(0.364)	(0.613)
Individual FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R-squared	0.1896	0.1897	0.1897	0.4473	0.4473	0.4473
Observations	3852	3852	3852	3525	3525	3525

Notes: Ordered-logit coefficients on respondent×topic pairs, survey-weighted; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses. Dependent variable: how often the respondent shares their view on the topic, on the four-level scale Never / Sometimes / Usually / Always Share. *Own View* and *Belief of Mean Student View* are the 0–1 scalings of Tables 2 and 11. *Share of Overton Windows Own View is In* is the share of other respondents' windows on the topic that contain the respondent's view (Table 7); *to Right* (*to Left*) is the share lying entirely below (above) it. All columns include Topic, Importance & Confidence, and Own View endpoint indicators as defined in Table 12; columns (1)–(3) also include that table's Base Controls and Left-Right Identity. *Individual FE*: respondent fixed effects. Columns (4)–(6) split each four-level answer into three yes/no outcomes (at least Sometimes, at least Usually, Always), stack them, and estimate a fixed-effects logit; *Observations* counts respondent×topic pairs. Further details in Table A14; OLS analogues in Table A15.

6 Conclusion

This paper has examined who self-censors, what they self-censor on, and why they do so at an elite university. In an environment that identifies as well left of center, when a student

holds more conservative views on politically-charged topics, they are significantly less likely to share those views. Yet those with more moderate views share their views the least as they see politically-charged topics as less important or have less confidence in their opinions than those with more extreme views. As a result, moderate views are especially suppressed.

Importance of the topic as well as confidence both affect self-censorship but so too does being outside of the Overton windows of those to the left–but not to the right–of one's own view. This may be driven in part by the views of those on the left regarding free speech as they are more supportive of speech restrictions and have narrower Overton windows. This is also reflected in student responses as to why they self-censor. While those on the left are more likely to do so for internal reasons such as nervousness or lack of confidence, those on the right are more likely to do so out of fear of being socially isolated.

With low levels of trust in higher education–especially among conservatives–it is important to understand what views are being expressed, how they are expressed, and how the college environment matters. Indeed, the fact that those who lean right are four times as likely to share their views off-campus with non-Duke students than in the classroom, while at the same time those on the left are less likely to share off-campus with non-Duke students than in the classroom, provides some credence to conservative concerns. Tracking student views, their willingness to engage with those who have alternative views, and their ability to disagree well over time would be helpful for colleges interested in knowing how they are preparing students to function well in a pluralistic society.

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Appendix A Additional Figures and Tables




Figure A1: Density of Own View Distribution in Different Topics

Notes: Kernel density estimates of Own View by topic, on the 0–100 scale where 0 is the most conservative/right-wing position and 100 the most progressive/left-wing position.




Figure A2: Share Frequency by Topic

Notes: Stacked bars show the percentage of respondents in each of the four original share-frequency categories (Never, Sometimes, Usually, Always Share) by topic, prior to the collapse into the binary measure used in Table 3.




Figure A3: Share Frequency in Different Environments

Notes: Stacked bars show the percentage of respondents in each of the four original share-frequency categories (Never, Sometimes, Usually, Always Share) by setting, prior to the collapse into the binary measure used in Table 4.




Figure A4: Self-censorship Reasons

Notes: Bars show the share of respondents selecting each reason for self-censoring (respondents could select multiple reasons). Reasons are ordered from more external (fear of isolation or exclusion) to more internal (lack of confidence in your opinion). See Table 8 notes for the full wording of each reason.

Table A1: Share of Political Ideology by Group

	Left	Lean Left	Center	Lean Right	Right
Whole sample					
	46.02	23.24	9.69	12.50	8.55
Gender					
Male	27.46	28.55	12.07	17.81	14.11
Female	60.97	18.31	8.16	8.50	4.06
Sexuality					
Straight	36.17	25.60	11.08	15.69	11.46
Non-straight	78.88	15.53	3.01	2.57	
Political Affiliation					
Socialist	98.41		1.59		
Liberal	63.05	23.43	5.00	3.33	5.19
Other	21.49	39.04	18.34	17.45	3.68
Libertarian		14.12	20.56	46.11	19.21
Conservative		6.08	10.36	35.79	47.77
Religion					
Agnostic	57.88	24.32	6.36	8.90	2.54
Atheist	68.29	20.71	3.24	6.38	1.38
Christian	25.19	22.02	13.09	20.80	18.89
Jewish	51.38	21.06	6.43	16.67	4.46
Other religious	46.62	25.97	16.07	4.19	7.15
Race					
Asian	50.82	23.67	11.99	9.57	3.94
Black	40.79	15.01	10.51	18.46	15.23
Hispanic	55.93	18.82	12.83	4.76	7.66
White	41.99	25.02	7.00	14.64	11.36
Other Race	50.42	20.94	9.39	13.97	5.28
International	34.88	32.47	10.94	15.18	6.53
College Class					
Not Senior	44.42	23.91	8.72	14.07	8.87
Senior	50.66	21.29	12.51	7.94	7.61
Major					
Hard Science	35.84	22.90	13.49	15.64	12.14
Engineering	25.14	35.24	14.66	20.54	4.42
Economics	37.40	21.31	6.93	12.93	21.43
Life Science	51.86	24.84	9.94	8.62	4.74
Social Science	60.15	18.06	6.31	10.10	5.37
Humanities	53.63	11.51	9.33	6.12	19.40
Other Major	65.02	26.16		8.82	

Notes: Cell entries are the percentage of respondents in each row group who fall in each left-right ideology category. Left-right categories are collapsed from the seven-point scale of Table 1: Left = Far Left / Left, Right = Right / Far Right. Respondents who answered "Unsure" or skipped the ideology question are excluded, leaving N=479. Demographic groups are defined as in Tables 2 and A2.

Table A2: Average Own View by Group: Additional Demographics

	Election	Abortion	BLM	Guns	Govt	Trans	Speech	Equity	Overall	N
Religion										
Agnostic	90.27	85.98	77.72	70.79	65.23	59.45	44.16	42.46	67.17	181
Atheist	91.02	92.76	85.16	78.46	69.70	66.92	53.24	47.72	73.37	58
Christian	81.05	67.90	72.13	57.07	61.21	49.01	42.46	36.01	58.49	162
Jewish	90.74	82.00	64.22	70.48	54.36	50.43	47.04	30.94	61.28	31
Other religious	80.99	83.87	74.98	69.99	67.18	56.30	45.23	38.21	65.17	62
Race										
Asian	88.96	83.96	75.68	70.64	64.53	60.12	47.75	39.81	66.48	108
Black	86.09	79.01	85.46	63.06	76.40	60.74	60.43	51.03	70.63	44
Hispanic	84.09	77.96	81.65	65.40	65.52	62.46	46.08	45.42	66.97	53
White	86.19	79.47	71.63	64.81	61.62	51.00	40.59	39.10	61.98	180
Other Race	84.31	79.85	74.43	63.26	57.20	54.86	45.79	35.84	61.93	53
International	84.54	79.82	72.95	78.30	65.30	52.70	42.08	27.72	62.65	60
College Class										
Not Senior	85.80	79.90	74.51	67.15	64.13	55.72	43.73	39.64	63.97	348
Senior	87.15	81.31	77.88	66.48	62.79	56.13	49.01	39.94	65.48	150
Major										
Hard Science	83.89	78.54	68.70	65.49	63.25	52.66	40.26	33.23	61.01	124
Engineering	87.27	75.45	73.02	59.24	56.99	50.07	45.02	31.48	59.83	57
Economics	81.02	78.47	67.76	68.37	57.04	50.64	36.36	28.94	58.56	45
Life Science	85.51	84.30	79.78	70.50	64.95	56.19	50.36	46.69	67.68	104
Social Science	90.13	86.03	80.30	67.97	69.65	60.96	50.69	46.34	69.31	116
Humanities	91.33	68.99	76.60	64.35	56.98	59.95	30.86	34.15	60.55	22
Other Major	84.57	72.74	85.61	73.54	69.29	65.25	50.05	56.09	69.63	30

Notes: Continues Table 2 for the remaining demographic splits (religion, race, class standing, and major). Own View is measured on the same 0–100 scale, where 0 is the most conservative/right-wing position and 100 the most progressive/left-wing position. *Overall* is each group's mean over all respondent×topic observations; N is the number of respondents in the group.

Table A3: Share Frequency on Different Issues: Additional Demographics

	Election	Abortion	BLM	Guns	Govt	Trans	Speech	Equity	Overall	N
Religion										
Agnostic	0.27	0.56	0.40	0.58	0.20	0.21	0.30	0.48	0.38	181
Atheist	0.22	0.61	0.38	0.66	0.34	0.27	0.32	0.66	0.43	58
Christian	0.28	0.37	0.42	0.47	0.34	0.15	0.35	0.52	0.36	162
Jewish	0.28	0.55	0.25	0.58	0.26	0.27	0.33	0.52	0.38	31
Other religious	0.34	0.58	0.49	0.56	0.35	0.26	0.28	0.57	0.43	62
Race										
Asian	0.22	0.42	0.32	0.48	0.24	0.15	0.23	0.46	0.32	108
Black	0.36	0.47	0.68	0.55	0.36	0.19	0.38	0.65	0.46	44
Hispanic	0.26	0.55	0.43	0.58	0.36	0.27	0.37	0.64	0.43	53
White	0.34	0.56	0.37	0.57	0.30	0.23	0.32	0.46	0.39	180
Other Race	0.20	0.50	0.45	0.54	0.27	0.20	0.36	0.58	0.39	53
International	0.20	0.47	0.41	0.57	0.22	0.20	0.34	0.64	0.38	60
College Class										
Not Senior	0.28	0.48	0.39	0.54	0.29	0.21	0.32	0.52	0.38	348
Senior	0.26	0.58	0.44	0.58	0.30	0.21	0.31	0.55	0.40	150
Major										
Hard Science	0.27	0.42	0.31	0.47	0.33	0.20	0.36	0.47	0.35	124
Engineering	0.15	0.36	0.26	0.43	0.23	0.13	0.17	0.34	0.26	57
Economics	0.34	0.53	0.43	0.60	0.38	0.24	0.32	0.47	0.42	45
Life Science	0.21	0.56	0.46	0.62	0.15	0.21	0.24	0.50	0.37	104
Social Science	0.31	0.56	0.46	0.58	0.31	0.17	0.34	0.67	0.43	116
Humanities	0.66	0.74	0.69	0.77	0.57	0.47	0.56	0.73	0.65	22
Other Major	0.32	0.56	0.51	0.56	0.24	0.30	0.47	0.65	0.45	30

Notes: Continues Table 3 for the remaining demographic splits (religion, race, class standing, and major). Share frequency is converted to a binary scale: 0 = Never Share / Sometimes Share; 1 = Usually Share / Always Share. N is the number of respondents in the group.

Table A4: Share Frequency in Different Environments: Additional Demographics

	On-campus In Classroom	On-campus Outside Classroom	Off-campus Duke Students	Off-campus non-Duke Students	N
Religion					
Agnostic	0.33	0.56	0.56	0.43	181
Atheist	0.36	0.69	0.60	0.42	58
Christian	0.30	0.42	0.43	0.45	162
Jewish	0.40	0.69	0.57	0.39	31
Other religious	0.42	0.62	0.59	0.58	62
Race					
Asian	0.30	0.44	0.42	0.43	108
Black	0.54	0.60	0.61	0.60	44
Hispanic	0.36	0.64	0.65	0.44	53
White	0.32	0.54	0.53	0.46	180
Other Race	0.35	0.60	0.60	0.38	53
International	0.30	0.55	0.44	0.42	60
College Class					
Not Senior	0.35	0.54	0.52	0.45	348
Senior	0.32	0.56	0.54	0.46	150
Major					
Hard Science	0.28	0.50	0.47	0.44	124
Engineering	0.13	0.40	0.39	0.41	57
Economics	0.38	0.51	0.49	0.46	45
Life Science	0.29	0.55	0.54	0.42	104
Social Science	0.50	0.65	0.60	0.45	116
Humanities	0.54	0.65	0.64	0.63	22
Other Major	0.43	0.62	0.71	0.55	30

Notes: Continues Table 4 for the remaining demographic splits (religion, race, class standing, and major). Share frequency in each setting is converted to a binary scale: 0 = Never Share / Sometimes Share; 1 = Usually Share / Always Share. N is the raw number of respondents in the group.

Table A5: Share Frequency with Different Audiences

	Students: Friends	Students: Other	Professors	Duke Administration	N
Gender					
Male	0.68	0.29	0.20	0.12	207
Female	0.75	0.45	0.29	0.10	275
Sexuality					
Straight	0.69	0.36	0.23	0.11	377
Non-straight	0.85	0.44	0.34	0.11	99
Religion					
Agnostic	0.72	0.34	0.24	0.13	181
Atheist	0.80	0.50	0.30	0.16	58
Christian	0.68	0.35	0.18	0.06	162
Jewish	0.77	0.42	0.29	0.07	31
Other religious	0.77	0.43	0.40	0.20	62
Political Affiliation					
Socialist	0.94	0.58	0.45	0.23	45
Liberal	0.80	0.49	0.30	0.12	244
Other	0.59	0.22	0.15	0.11	141
Libertarian	0.55	0.10	0.11	0.04	33
Conservative	0.63	0.25	0.18	0.00	33
Ideology					
Left	0.84	0.47	0.35	0.13	227
Lean Left	0.72	0.37	0.16	0.10	108
Center	0.46	0.16	0.15	0.11	50
Lean Right	0.44	0.19	0.12	0.06	56
Right	0.77	0.44	0.21	0.12	39
Race					
Asian	0.66	0.31	0.19	0.09	108
Black	0.81	0.58	0.30	0.16	44
Hispanic	0.78	0.44	0.24	0.17	53
White	0.73	0.36	0.28	0.08	180
Other Race	0.73	0.40	0.24	0.14	53
International	0.66	0.31	0.22	0.16	60
College Class					
Not Senior	0.73	0.38	0.25	0.10	348
Senior	0.71	0.38	0.23	0.16	150
Major					
Hard Science	0.69	0.32	0.18	0.11	124
Engineering	0.65	0.25	0.10	0.12	57
Economics	0.74	0.34	0.21	0.08	45
Life Science	0.67	0.39	0.21	0.09	104
Social Science	0.78	0.48	0.35	0.12	116
Humanities	0.98	0.53	0.47	0.12	22
Other Major	0.80	0.45	0.47	0.20	30
Total	0.72	0.38	0.25	0.11	498

Notes: Cell entries are the share of respondents in each group who usually or always share their opinion with each audience, from the question "Given the opportunity, how often, if at all, do you share your opinion with each of the following?" (friends who are students; other students; professors and faculty; Duke administration). Share frequency is converted to a binary scale as in Table 3: 0 = Never Share / Sometimes Share; 1 = Usually Share / Always Share. N is the number of respondents in the group.

Table A6: Topic Importance: Additional Demographics

	Election	Abortion	BLM	Guns	Govt	Trans	Speech	Equity	Overall	N
Religion										
Agnostic	0.16	0.81	0.56	0.74	0.33	0.24	0.40	0.69	0.49	181
Atheist	0.21	0.93	0.68	0.81	0.50	0.48	0.36	0.77	0.59	58
Christian	0.31	0.66	0.61	0.71	0.51	0.26	0.53	0.79	0.55	162
Jewish	0.31	0.70	0.49	0.77	0.38	0.19	0.47	0.80	0.51	31
Other religious	0.29	0.77	0.57	0.69	0.45	0.27	0.41	0.73	0.52	62
Race										
Asian	0.24	0.79	0.55	0.73	0.45	0.22	0.42	0.72	0.51	108
Black	0.31	0.77	0.87	0.70	0.53	0.34	0.44	0.79	0.59	44
Hispanic	0.22	0.75	0.69	0.77	0.34	0.34	0.48	0.90	0.56	53
White	0.25	0.72	0.53	0.70	0.39	0.25	0.42	0.63	0.49	180
Other Race	0.17	0.81	0.68	0.74	0.48	0.28	0.51	0.89	0.57	53
International	0.24	0.79	0.45	0.81	0.53	0.32	0.50	0.85	0.56	60
College Class										
Not Senior	0.24	0.76	0.59	0.75	0.46	0.27	0.46	0.77	0.54	348
Senior	0.24	0.75	0.57	0.69	0.33	0.28	0.39	0.69	0.49	150
Major										
Hard Science	0.26	0.68	0.45	0.67	0.44	0.29	0.48	0.68	0.49	124
Engineering	0.16	0.72	0.53	0.72	0.52	0.22	0.46	0.74	0.51	57
Economics	0.29	0.67	0.43	0.83	0.64	0.18	0.54	0.78	0.55	45
Life Science	0.26	0.82	0.64	0.73	0.29	0.26	0.39	0.71	0.51	104
Social Science	0.27	0.82	0.75	0.78	0.40	0.26	0.38	0.82	0.56	116
Humanities	0.28	0.83	0.64	0.85	0.58	0.45	0.68	0.90	0.65	22
Other Major	0.06	0.80	0.74	0.62	0.38	0.37	0.40	0.73	0.51	30

Notes: Continues Table 5 for the remaining demographic splits (religion, race, class standing, and major). Cell entries are the share of respondents in each group who rate the topic as very or extremely important to them.

Table A7: Topic Confidence: Additional Demographics

	Election	Abortion	BLM	Guns	Govt	Trans	Speech	Equity	Overall	N
Religion										
Agnostic	0.43	0.72	0.44	0.62	0.25	0.30	0.31	0.51	0.45	181
Atheist	0.49	0.85	0.59	0.68	0.32	0.41	0.40	0.66	0.55	58
Christian	0.48	0.69	0.52	0.62	0.42	0.29	0.53	0.60	0.52	162
Jewish	0.46	0.63	0.32	0.55	0.21	0.28	0.56	0.46	0.43	31
Other religious	0.43	0.67	0.55	0.60	0.32	0.27	0.38	0.61	0.48	62
Race										
Asian	0.41	0.69	0.43	0.62	0.31	0.26	0.29	0.58	0.45	108
Black	0.40	0.84	0.86	0.68	0.41	0.29	0.53	0.76	0.59	44
Hispanic	0.42	0.72	0.52	0.56	0.30	0.33	0.36	0.67	0.49	53
White	0.53	0.71	0.44	0.66	0.30	0.32	0.45	0.44	0.48	180
Other Race	0.41	0.76	0.53	0.50	0.29	0.30	0.48	0.60	0.48	53
International	0.35	0.60	0.43	0.64	0.39	0.27	0.51	0.70	0.49	60
College Class										
Not Senior	0.46	0.73	0.49	0.60	0.32	0.30	0.44	0.59	0.49	348
Senior	0.41	0.67	0.48	0.68	0.30	0.31	0.37	0.50	0.47	150
Major										
Hard Science	0.45	0.68	0.45	0.55	0.32	0.27	0.43	0.52	0.46	124
Engineering	0.42	0.62	0.29	0.62	0.33	0.34	0.46	0.55	0.45	57
Economics	0.41	0.64	0.47	0.70	0.45	0.26	0.50	0.50	0.49	45
Life Science	0.42	0.78	0.49	0.62	0.23	0.34	0.30	0.55	0.47	104
Social Science	0.47	0.73	0.57	0.65	0.32	0.26	0.44	0.64	0.51	116
Humanities	0.54	0.88	0.63	0.81	0.44	0.41	0.57	0.63	0.61	22
Other Major	0.55	0.78	0.71	0.58	0.31	0.36	0.40	0.57	0.53	30

Notes: Continues Table 6 for the remaining demographic splits (religion, race, class standing, and major). Cell entries are the share of respondents in each group who report being very or extremely confident in their opinion on the topic.

Table A8: Share of Censorship Reasons: Additional Demographics

	Exclusion	Judgement	Criticism	Opinion Invalid	Opinion Unwanted	Misinterpreted	Mischaracterize Self	Lack Confidence	N
Religion									
Agnostic	0.30	0.55	0.33	0.33	0.34	0.70	0.60	0.46	181
Atheist	0.33	0.63	0.45	0.32	0.28	0.71	0.67	0.42	58
Christian	0.37	0.64	0.49	0.41	0.36	0.70	0.63	0.34	162
Jewish	0.28	0.55	0.28	0.46	0.44	0.76	0.75	0.43	31
Other religious	0.31	0.55	0.41	0.44	0.30	0.83	0.58	0.36	62
Race									
Asian	0.32	0.64	0.38	0.43	0.30	0.75	0.61	0.42	108
Black	0.22	0.36	0.35	0.33	0.22	0.60	0.66	0.30	44
Hispanic	0.32	0.58	0.50	0.34	0.38	0.70	0.58	0.38	53
White	0.31	0.63	0.38	0.42	0.42	0.71	0.69	0.43	180
Other Race	0.42	0.57	0.51	0.29	0.34	0.74	0.64	0.45	53
International	0.39	0.58	0.39	0.27	0.18	0.78	0.43	0.25	60
College Class									
Not Senior	0.32	0.59	0.41	0.37	0.34	0.77	0.62	0.39	348
Senior	0.35	0.59	0.41	0.39	0.37	0.57	0.64	0.43	150
Major									
Hard Science	0.39	0.62	0.37	0.36	0.33	0.70	0.51	0.39	124
Engineering	0.36	0.67	0.36	0.45	0.34	0.76	0.61	0.37	57
Economics	0.55	0.55	0.43	0.36	0.42	0.75	0.54	0.35	45
Life Science	0.26	0.67	0.50	0.35	0.33	0.78	0.68	0.50	104
Social Science	0.26	0.53	0.43	0.44	0.38	0.69	0.75	0.40	116
Humanities	0.32	0.44	0.33	0.19	0.20	0.57	0.62	0.21	22
Other Major	0.14	0.41	0.29	0.31	0.33	0.66	0.67	0.36	30

Notes: Continues Table 8 for the remaining demographic splits (religion, race, class standing, and major). Cell entries are the share of respondents in each group who selected the given reason; respondents could select multiple reasons, so rows need not sum to 100 percent. Column abbreviations as in Table 8.

Table A9: Public Speakers by Topic: Additional Demographics

	Election	Abortion	BLM	Guns	Govt	Trans	Speech	Equity	Sample
Religion									
Agnostic	0.35	0.40	0.35	0.38	0.25	0.37	0.34	0.32	0.36
Atheist	0.09	0.14	0.11	0.13	0.13	0.15	0.11	0.14	0.11
Christian	0.34	0.25	0.35	0.29	0.40	0.24	0.36	0.33	0.34
Jewish	0.07	0.07	0.04	0.07	0.06	0.09	0.07	0.07	0.07
Other religious	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.13	0.15	0.16	0.11	0.13	0.12
Race									
Asian	0.17	0.18	0.17	0.19	0.18	0.15	0.15	0.19	0.21
Black	0.10	0.07	0.14	0.08	0.10	0.07	0.10	0.10	0.08
Hispanic	0.12	0.15	0.14	0.14	0.17	0.17	0.15	0.16	0.13
White	0.46	0.42	0.35	0.39	0.39	0.42	0.38	0.33	0.38
Other Race	0.08	0.11	0.12	0.11	0.10	0.10	0.12	0.12	0.11
International	0.06	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.07	0.08	0.09	0.11	0.09
College Class									
Not Senior	0.76	0.71	0.72	0.73	0.74	0.74	0.75	0.73	0.74
Senior	0.24	0.29	0.28	0.27	0.26	0.26	0.25	0.27	0.26
Major									
Hard Science	0.25	0.22	0.20	0.22	0.30	0.25	0.29	0.23	0.26
Engineering	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.10	0.10	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.12
Economics	0.11	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.12	0.10	0.09	0.08	0.09
Life Science	0.15	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.10	0.20	0.15	0.19	0.20
Social Science	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.24	0.24	0.19	0.24	0.29	0.23
Humanities	0.10	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.08	0.09	0.07	0.06	0.04
Other Major	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.06	0.05	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.06
N	136	262	207	279	142	101	157	272	498

Notes: Continues Table 9 for the remaining demographic splits (religion, race, class standing, and major). A respondent is classified as a public speaker on a topic if they are coded as usually or always sharing their view on that topic. Cell entries are the share of public speakers on each topic accounted for by each demographic category; within a demographic split, columns sum to one.

Table A10: Public Speakers by Environment: Additional Demographics

	On-campus In Classroom	On-campus Outside Classroom	Off-campus Duke Students	Off-campus non-Duke Students	Sample
Religion					
Agnostic	0.35	0.37	0.38	0.34	0.36
Atheist	0.12	0.14	0.13	0.11	0.11
Christian	0.30	0.26	0.28	0.33	0.34
Jewish	0.08	0.09	0.07	0.06	0.07
Other religious	0.15	0.14	0.14	0.16	0.12
Race					
Asian	0.19	0.17	0.17	0.20	0.21
Black	0.13	0.09	0.09	0.11	0.08
Hispanic	0.14	0.16	0.16	0.13	0.13
White	0.35	0.38	0.38	0.39	0.38
Other Race	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.09	0.11
International	0.08	0.09	0.07	0.08	0.09
College Class					
Not Senior	0.76	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.74
Senior	0.24	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26
Major					
Hard Science	0.21	0.24	0.23	0.25	0.26
Engineering	0.05	0.09	0.09	0.11	0.12
Economics	0.10	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.09
Life Science	0.16	0.20	0.20	0.18	0.20
Social Science	0.33	0.27	0.26	0.23	0.23
Humanities	0.07	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.04
Other Major	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.06
N	173	271	263	226	498

Notes: Continues Table 10 for the remaining demographic splits (religion, race, class standing, and major). A respondent is classified as a public speaker in a setting if they are coded as usually or always sharing their views there. Cell entries are the share of public speakers in each setting accounted for by each demographic category; within a demographic split, columns sum to one.

Table A11: Average Perceived Mean View by Group: Additional Demographics

	Election	Abortion	BLM	Guns	Govt	Trans	Speech	Equity	Overall	N
Religion										
Agnostic	83.03	74.05	73.34	65.11	64.24	63.08	52.90	46.52	65.46	181
Atheist	84.88	77.48	80.09	63.87	65.14	65.16	55.75	45.80	67.03	58
Christian	79.49	76.22	76.40	66.66	71.09	66.23	55.97	47.88	67.53	162
Jewish	85.90	74.25	76.15	70.51	66.25	62.50	57.06	53.56	68.28	31
Other religious	76.86	72.99	72.93	61.55	67.91	61.95	56.03	52.59	65.43	62
Race										
Asian	81.83	74.34	73.99	64.94	67.59	64.61	53.92	49.42	66.47	108
Black	75.68	71.51	64.94	59.89	67.49	59.83	51.69	48.23	62.46	44
Hispanic	77.66	71.23	76.03	63.46	62.04	62.68	55.68	46.86	64.82	53
White	84.40	77.50	77.09	67.93	69.35	65.95	56.01	49.84	68.55	180
Other Race	79.76	72.59	75.43	69.37	64.66	59.91	54.03	46.91	65.34	53
International	80.32	77.65	77.91	57.97	67.49	66.19	55.54	41.26	65.37	60
College Class										
Not Senior	80.30	74.22	74.35	64.65	67.29	63.49	52.95	47.98	65.66	348
Senior	84.78	77.38	77.78	67.58	66.98	65.96	60.73	48.78	68.92	150
Major										
Hard Science	79.41	75.48	73.35	69.11	66.82	60.86	53.61	46.33	65.79	124
Engineering	84.06	78.17	76.47	63.54	70.14	66.66	54.90	52.65	68.05	57
Economics	83.88	72.17	78.01	65.94	73.52	67.46	56.27	42.93	67.27	45
Life Science	78.47	74.72	74.46	63.60	63.17	61.50	55.98	48.41	65.26	104
Social Science	83.53	75.53	75.02	64.80	66.52	67.03	57.43	48.22	67.35	116
Humanities	85.02	73.33	76.89	65.93	70.72	65.51	53.51	48.24	67.16	22
Other Major	80.61	71.14	78.66	60.63	66.48	65.40	47.47	53.25	65.51	30

Notes: Continues Table 11 for the remaining demographic splits (religion, race, class standing, and major). Cell entries are each group's average belief about the mean view of the Duke undergraduate student body on each topic, on the same 0–100 scale (0 = most conservative/right-wing, 100 = most progressive/left-wing). *Overall* as in Table 2; N is the number of respondents in the group.

Table A12: Overton Window Width Regression (Detail)

	Overton Window Width						
	Pooled OLS			Excl. Speech		Fixed effects	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Own View	-0.144***	-0.127***	-0.128***	-0.082**	-0.080**	-0.046**	-0.048**
	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Belief of Mean Student View	0.037	0.026	0.032	-0.014	-0.009	-0.030	-0.028
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Absolute Value Own View–50	-0.075	-0.072	-0.002	-0.076	-0.009	-0.165***	-0.117***
	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.035)	(0.036)
Own Free-Speech View				-0.186***	-0.184***		
				(0.038)	(0.036)		
Own View=100	-0.161***	-0.161***	-0.144***	-0.157***	-0.140***	-0.138***	-0.127***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Own View=0	-0.105***	-0.107***	-0.094**	-0.111**	-0.098**	-0.132***	-0.127***
	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.039)	(0.038)
Woman	-0.071***	-0.069***	-0.072***	-0.044**	-0.046**		
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)		
Gender NA	-0.145***	-0.140***	-0.149***	-0.150***	-0.157***		
	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.038)		
Non-straight	0.009	0.011	0.013	0.020	0.021		
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)		
Sexuality Prefer not to Answer	-0.005	-0.004	-0.008	0.004	-0.001		
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.041)		
Asian	-0.043*	-0.044*	-0.048**	-0.026	-0.031		
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.024)		
Black	-0.082**	-0.079**	-0.076**	-0.036	-0.031		
	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.038)	(0.039)		
Hispanic	-0.047	-0.049	-0.047	-0.058*	-0.056*		
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.033)		
Other Race	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	-0.003		
	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.031)		
International	-0.019	-0.020	-0.021	-0.022	-0.026		
	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)		
Agnostic	-0.017	-0.012	-0.013	-0.024	-0.023		
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)		
Atheist	-0.043	-0.035	-0.028	-0.027	-0.019		
	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.029)		
Jewish	0.044	0.048	0.047	0.059	0.057		
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.038)		
Other religious	-0.048*	-0.049*	-0.046	-0.073**	-0.070**		
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.029)		
Election	-0.187***	-0.190***	-0.193***	-0.193***	-0.198***	-0.194***	-0.195***

	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Abortion	-0.095***	-0.098***	-0.076***	-0.100***	-0.080***	-0.105***	-0.087***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.015)
BLM	-0.127***	-0.128***	-0.116***	-0.127***	-0.117***	-0.135***	-0.127***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Guns	-0.061***	-0.062***	-0.042***	-0.065***	-0.046***	-0.078***	-0.063***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Trans	-0.107***	-0.106***	-0.106***	-0.102***	-0.102***	-0.103***	-0.102***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Speech	-0.104***	-0.101***	-0.092***			-0.099***	-0.090***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)			(0.013)	(0.013)
Equity	-0.035**	-0.033**	-0.013	-0.029*	-0.011	-0.026*	-0.011
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Left		-0.060*	-0.049	-0.048	-0.039		
		(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.035)		
Lean Left		-0.063*	-0.051	-0.054	-0.043		
		(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.034)		
Lean Right		-0.044	-0.031	-0.052	-0.041		
		(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.043)	(0.042)		
Right		-0.035	-0.016	-0.038	-0.019		
		(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.056)	(0.054)		
Ideology NA		-0.069	-0.066	-0.060	-0.058		
		(0.060)	(0.057)	(0.062)	(0.060)		
Not at all important			-0.015		-0.002		0.007
			(0.025)		(0.026)		(0.018)
Slightly important			-0.002		0.007		-0.004
			(0.017)		(0.018)		(0.012)
Very important			-0.015		-0.009		0.007
			(0.013)		(0.015)		(0.011)
Extremely important			0.006		0.016		0.013
			(0.018)		(0.019)		(0.013)
Not confident			0.034		0.026		0.033*
			(0.023)		(0.023)		(0.018)
Slightly confident			0.022		0.012		0.007
			(0.018)		(0.019)		(0.013)
Very confident			-0.008		-0.014		-0.024**
			(0.016)		(0.016)		(0.011)
Extremely confident			-0.089***		-0.099***		-0.073***
			(0.021)		(0.022)		(0.014)
Constant	0.835***	0.879***	0.851***	0.940***	0.912***	0.770***	0.758***
	(0.035)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.024)	(0.026)
Individual FE	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.2445	0.2477	0.2626	0.2805	0.2958	0.2830	0.2941
Observations	3220	3220	3215	2788	2785	3239	3234

Notes: Full coefficients for Table 12. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses. Omitted categories: man, straight, White, Christian, left, *govt*, moderately important, moderately confident.

Table A13: Overton Window Width Regression Robustness (Detail)

	Overton Window Width						
	Pooled OLS			Excl. Speech		Fixed effects	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Own View	-0.150***	-0.146***	-0.146***	-0.104***	-0.102***	-0.059***	-0.058***
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Belief of Mean Student View	0.038	0.035	0.038	-0.001	0.002	-0.011	-0.014
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.031)	(0.032)
Absolute Value Own View–50	-0.070	-0.068	0.002	-0.078	-0.011	-0.144***	-0.103***
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.038)	(0.039)
Own Free-Speech View				-0.187***	-0.185***		
				(0.039)	(0.038)		
Own View=100	-0.132***	-0.134***	-0.122***	-0.125***	-0.115***	-0.100***	-0.093***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Own View=0	-0.104**	-0.102**	-0.092**	-0.106**	-0.096**	-0.125***	-0.118***
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.039)	(0.038)
Woman	-0.070***	-0.071***	-0.072***	-0.046**	-0.045**		
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)		
Gender NA	-0.142***	-0.139***	-0.145***	-0.149***	-0.153***		
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.042)	(0.040)		
Non-straight	0.014	0.012	0.014	0.021	0.023		
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)		
Sexuality Prefer not to Answer	0.004	0.002	-0.002	0.005	0.001		
	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.044)	(0.042)		
Asian	-0.043*	-0.045*	-0.047**	-0.028	-0.031		
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.025)		
Black	-0.083**	-0.077**	-0.071**	-0.033	-0.025		
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.039)		
Hispanic	-0.053	-0.057*	-0.055*	-0.068**	-0.066**		
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.032)		
Other Race	-0.014	-0.015	-0.012	-0.018	-0.016		
	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.032)		
International	-0.025	-0.024	-0.024	-0.027	-0.029		
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.029)		
Agnostic	-0.013	-0.012	-0.012	-0.024	-0.024		
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)		
Atheist	-0.037	-0.034	-0.026	-0.026	-0.017		
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)		
Jewish	0.046	0.047	0.046	0.060	0.058		
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.036)		
Other religious	-0.043	-0.049	-0.046	-0.072**	-0.070**		
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.031)		
Abortion	-0.102***	-0.102***	-0.081***	-0.105***	-0.085***	-0.116***	-0.099***

	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.015)
BLM	-0.130***	-0.130***	-0.118***	-0.129***	-0.119***	-0.140***	-0.133***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Guns	-0.062***	-0.063***	-0.043***	-0.065***	-0.047***	-0.080***	-0.066***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Trans	-0.108***	-0.108***	-0.106***	-0.104***	-0.103***	-0.105***	-0.106***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Speech	-0.103***	-0.103***	-0.094***			-0.098***	-0.092***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)			(0.013)	(0.013)
Equity	-0.035**	-0.035**	-0.016	-0.031**	-0.013	-0.025*	-0.011
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Left		-0.056	-0.048	-0.040	-0.034		
		(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.036)		
Lean Left		-0.066*	-0.057	-0.054	-0.046		
		(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.036)		
Lean Right		-0.069	-0.057	-0.076*	-0.068		
		(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.044)	(0.044)		
Right		-0.059	-0.041	-0.060	-0.043		
		(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.055)		
Ideology NA		-0.081	-0.078	-0.071	-0.068		
		(0.059)	(0.057)	(0.061)	(0.059)		
Not at all important			-0.019		-0.005		0.014
			(0.034)		(0.037)		(0.023)
Slightly important			-0.009		-0.001		-0.003
			(0.018)		(0.020)		(0.013)
Very important			-0.018		-0.013		0.002
			(0.014)		(0.016)		(0.011)
Extremely important			-0.001		0.010		-0.003
			(0.019)		(0.020)		(0.014)
Not confident			0.029		0.021		0.021
			(0.025)		(0.026)		(0.020)
Slightly confident			0.012		0.001		0.001
			(0.018)		(0.020)		(0.013)
Very confident			-0.011		-0.016		-0.017
			(0.016)		(0.017)		(0.011)
Extremely confident			-0.086***		-0.096***		-0.058***
			(0.022)		(0.024)		(0.016)
Constant	0.833***	0.890***	0.869***	0.949***	0.929***	0.759***	0.754***
	(0.036)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.024)	(0.025)
Individual FE	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.1832	0.1873	0.2017	0.2196	0.2344	0.1849	0.1946
Observations	2838	2838	2834	2410	2408	2855	2851

Notes: As Table A12, excluding *election*. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses.

Table A14: Share Frequency Ordered Logit (Detail)

	Share Frequency					
	Ordered Logit			FE Ordered Logit		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Own View	0.645***		0.126	0.664**		-0.076
	(0.203)		(0.389)	(0.285)		(0.494)
Own View=0	-0.182	-0.159	-0.158	0.295	0.308	0.308
	(0.240)	(0.243)	(0.243)	(0.294)	(0.295)	(0.295)
Own View=100	0.309***	0.235*	0.263**	0.793***	0.723***	0.709***
	(0.120)	(0.127)	(0.119)	(0.153)	(0.163)	(0.148)
Belief of Mean Student View	-0.284	-0.295	-0.288	-0.668**	-0.674**	-0.678**
	(0.276)	(0.277)	(0.276)	(0.326)	(0.328)	(0.326)
Share of Overton Windows Own View is In	0.337			0.610**		
	(0.256)			(0.303)		
Share of Overton Windows to Right of Own View		0.191			-0.097	
		(0.315)			(0.392)	
Share of Overton Windows to Left of Own View		-0.890***	-0.822		-1.168***	-1.218**
		(0.290)	(0.510)		(0.364)	(0.613)
Woman	-0.130	-0.133	-0.132			
	(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.138)			
Gender NA	0.279	0.278	0.280			
	(0.339)	(0.340)	(0.339)			
Non-straight	0.193	0.191	0.193			
	(0.166)	(0.166)	(0.166)			
Sexuality Prefer not to Answer	-0.182	-0.180	-0.178			
	(0.415)	(0.415)	(0.415)			
Asian	-0.633***	-0.634***	-0.634***			
	(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.187)			
Black	-0.005	-0.009	-0.004			
	(0.288)	(0.288)	(0.287)			
Hispanic	0.040	0.037	0.038			
	(0.250)	(0.250)	(0.250)			
Other Race	-0.076	-0.076	-0.076			
	(0.224)	(0.223)	(0.224)			
International	0.012	0.012	0.013			
	(0.237)	(0.237)	(0.237)			
Agnostic	0.146	0.146	0.146			
	(0.165)	(0.165)	(0.165)			
Atheist	-0.050	-0.053	-0.052			
	(0.219)	(0.219)	(0.220)			
Jewish	0.285	0.284	0.284			
	(0.301)	(0.301)	(0.301)			
Other religious	0.436	0.437	0.436			
	(0.286)	(0.286)	(0.286)			
Election	-0.397***	-0.179	-0.224	-0.627***	-0.409**	-0.381*
	(0.132)	(0.136)	(0.183)	(0.179)	(0.187)	(0.229)
Abortion	-0.223*	-0.105	-0.126	-0.170	-0.051	-0.038
	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.139)	(0.173)	(0.173)	(0.200)
BLM	-0.050	0.051	0.034	-0.084	0.018	0.028
	(0.112)	(0.113)	(0.129)	(0.162)	(0.159)	(0.182)
Guns	0.326***	0.368***	0.361***	0.601***	0.644***	0.649***
	(0.110)	(0.109)	(0.113)	(0.158)	(0.157)	(0.162)
Trans	-0.375***	-0.395***	-0.381***	-0.639***	-0.657***	-0.663***
	(0.123)	(0.125)	(0.120)	(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.184)

Speech	0.088	0.011	0.032	0.071	-0.007	-0.019
	(0.110)	(0.111)	(0.104)	(0.165)	(0.169)	(0.156)
Equity	0.457***	0.353***	0.375***	0.650***	0.543***	0.530***
	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.134)	(0.193)	(0.194)	(0.199)
Left	0.173	0.168	0.170			
	(0.234)	(0.234)	(0.234)			
Lean Left	0.071	0.067	0.068			
	(0.270)	(0.270)	(0.270)			
Lean Right	-0.702**	-0.701**	-0.701**			
	(0.324)	(0.324)	(0.324)			
Right	0.196	0.194	0.198			
	(0.328)	(0.327)	(0.327)			
Ideology NA	0.215	0.214	0.214			
	(0.373)	(0.373)	(0.373)			
Not at all important	-0.965***	-0.963***	-0.964***	-1.008***	-1.011***	-1.011***
	(0.219)	(0.219)	(0.219)	(0.280)	(0.281)	(0.280)
Slightly important	-0.542***	-0.541***	-0.542***	-0.564***	-0.565***	-0.565***
	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.185)	(0.185)	(0.185)
Very important	0.555***	0.553***	0.555***	1.058***	1.057***	1.057***
	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.132)
Extremely important	1.501***	1.499***	1.503***	2.137***	2.137***	2.135***
	(0.152)	(0.152)	(0.151)	(0.198)	(0.198)	(0.198)
Not confident	-1.173***	-1.172***	-1.174***	-1.406***	-1.406***	-1.405***
	(0.189)	(0.189)	(0.189)	(0.300)	(0.300)	(0.300)
Slightly confident	-0.451***	-0.450***	-0.452***	-0.753***	-0.754***	-0.754***
	(0.117)	(0.117)	(0.117)	(0.147)	(0.148)	(0.148)
Very confident	0.560***	0.559***	0.560***	1.006***	1.006***	1.006***
	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.140)
Extremely confident	1.309***	1.306***	1.308***	1.925***	1.922***	1.922***
	(0.159)	(0.159)	(0.159)	(0.199)	(0.198)	(0.198)
Individual FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R-squared	0.1896	0.1897	0.1897	0.4473	0.4473	0.4473
Observations	3852	3852	3852	3525	3525	3525

Notes: Full coefficients for Table 13. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses. Omitted categories: man, straight, White, Christian, left, *govt*, moderately important, moderately confident.

Table A15: Share Frequency Linear Regression (Detail)

	Share Frequency					
	OLS			Fixed Effects		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Own View	0.295***		0.164	0.201***		0.142
	(0.085)		(0.158)	(0.071)		(0.129)
Own View=0	-0.097	-0.090	-0.091	0.000	-0.003	-0.004
	(0.095)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)
Own View=100	0.131**	0.098*	0.120**	0.153***	0.140***	0.143***
	(0.051)	(0.054)	(0.051)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.040)
Belief of Mean Student View	-0.129	-0.132	-0.130	-0.145*	-0.138*	-0.145*
	(0.114)	(0.115)	(0.114)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)
Share of Overton Windows Own View is In	0.078			0.094		
	(0.104)			(0.079)		
Share of Overton Windows to Right of Own View		0.160			0.039	
		(0.132)			(0.101)	
Share of Overton Windows to Left of Own View		-0.327***	-0.205		-0.252***	-0.112
		(0.116)	(0.202)		(0.093)	(0.162)
Woman	-0.048	-0.049	-0.048			
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)			
Gender NA	0.117	0.117	0.117			
	(0.149)	(0.149)	(0.149)			
Non-straight	0.095	0.094	0.095			
	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)			
Sexuality Prefer not to Answer	-0.061	-0.060	-0.060			
	(0.169)	(0.169)	(0.169)			
Asian	-0.255***	-0.256***	-0.255***			
	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.076)			
Black	-0.014	-0.015	-0.013			
	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)			
Hispanic	0.015	0.014	0.015			
	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.111)			
Other Race	-0.058	-0.058	-0.058			
	(0.092)	(0.091)	(0.091)			
International	0.005	0.006	0.006			
	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.105)			
Agnostic	0.059	0.059	0.059			
	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)			
Atheist	-0.029	-0.029	-0.029			
	(0.095)	(0.094)	(0.095)			
Jewish	0.111	0.110	0.111			
	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.124)			
Other religious	0.191	0.192	0.192			
	(0.125)	(0.125)	(0.125)			
Election	-0.155***	-0.055	-0.111	-0.152***	-0.089**	-0.134**
	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.074)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.062)
Abortion	-0.083*	-0.029	-0.058	-0.037	-0.002	-0.029
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.058)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.054)
BLM	-0.015	0.031	0.007	0.008	0.038	0.014
	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.054)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.050)
Guns	0.133***	0.153***	0.142***	0.152***	0.165***	0.154***
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.045)
Trans	-0.124**	-0.132***	-0.124**	-0.148***	-0.152***	-0.156***
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.045)

Speech	0.021	-0.013	0.008	0.009	-0.014	-0.002
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.040)
Equity	0.203***	0.156***	0.183***	0.206***	0.175***	0.195***
	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.056)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.053)
Left	0.062	0.060	0.061			
	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.102)			
Lean Left	0.017	0.015	0.016			
	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.119)			
Lean Right	-0.285**	-0.285**	-0.285**			
	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.126)			
Right	0.068	0.067	0.069			
	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.140)			
Ideology NA	0.076	0.075	0.075			
	(0.161)	(0.161)	(0.161)			
Not at all important	-0.238***	-0.237***	-0.237***	-0.162***	-0.163***	-0.162***
	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)
Slightly important	-0.173***	-0.173***	-0.173***	-0.148***	-0.149***	-0.148***
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Very important	0.271***	0.270***	0.271***	0.283***	0.283***	0.282***
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Extremely important	0.724***	0.724***	0.725***	0.640***	0.641***	0.638***
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Not confident	-0.386***	-0.385***	-0.386***	-0.379***	-0.379***	-0.378***
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)
Slightly confident	-0.187***	-0.186***	-0.187***	-0.208***	-0.208***	-0.207***
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Very confident	0.265***	0.265***	0.265***	0.270***	0.269***	0.269***
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Extremely confident	0.588***	0.586***	0.588***	0.577***	0.576***	0.577***
	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Constant	1.719***	1.989***	1.887***	1.768***	1.987***	1.890***
	(0.155)	(0.147)	(0.173)	(0.080)	(0.070)	(0.113)
Individual FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.4046	0.4047	0.4047	0.4326	0.4322	0.4324
Observations	3852	3852	3852	3883	3883	3883

Notes: OLS analogue of Table A14: same regressors, dependent variable coded 1 = Never Share to 4 = Always Share. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses. Columns (4)–(6) include respondent fixed effects, which absorb the time-invariant demographic controls; *Observations* are respondent-topic pairs throughout.

Appendix B Survey Instrument and Sample

B.1 Distribution, Sample, and Weighting

The survey was conducted from February 7 to March 3, 2023. We received 656 submissions, of which 498 met eligibility criteria and were included in our analysis. To qualify, respondents had to be at least 18 years old, currently enrolled as Duke undergraduate students, and progress at least 90 percent of the way through the survey. To be retained, respondents were additionally required to answer more than five of the forty topic-belief questions and leave fewer than twenty of the fifty-nine follow-up questions blank. One respondent requested to have their response removed due to incorrect answers before retaking the survey.

To minimize sampling bias, we used diverse recruitment methods and offered compensation for survey completion. Participants were recruited in two ways:

1. A random sample of 1,398 students received recruitment emails with a survey link.
2. A survey link was posted on the Duke Interdisciplinary Behavioral Research Center (IBRC) board, accessible to all members. Additionally, about half of IBRC members received a direct email about the survey.

Each student was allowed to complete the survey only once, regardless of recruitment method. All students who completed the survey received a 20 dollar gift card, whether or not their responses were included in the final analysis.

Of those contacted directly, 37 percent completed the survey and of IBRC members, 17 percent completed the survey. These response rates are of similar magnitudes found in other surveys of college students; the National Survey of Student Engagement reported a response rate of 26% in 2023 (National Survey of Student Engagement, 2023). Overall, 10 percent of the student body submitted a survey and 8 percent submitted a survey that was included in our analysis. Of the 498 students who met the eligibility criteria, 394 (79%) came from the random sample.

Since survey response was voluntary, an obvious concern is that respondents may have varied fundamentally from the overall Duke undergraduate student population, in a way that could cause average responses to be unrepresentative of the true Duke environment. This is particularly important in our context because we wished to understand where students sat in the ideological distribution on campus on an issue-by-issue basis, and how this affected choices of whether to self-censor.

To limit such concerns, we weighted the survey responses to match the demographic composition of the Duke undergraduate student population (after first discarding unusable responses

per the above). Specifically, we obtained official IPEDS demographic data from the university administration that showed the number of enrollees in each race (6 categories) by sex by matriculating class (4 categories) combination.[18] This produced 48 race-sex-cohort cells. For each cell, we reweighted observations by a constant factor such that the share of the cell's respondents in the survey data was equal to its share in the Duke administrative data. That is, denoting the share of respondents in our survey and the Duke institutional data in race-sex-class cell rsc as π_{rsc} and ρ_{rsc} respectively, we set survey weights $w_{rsc} = \frac{\rho_{rsc}}{\pi_{rsc}}$. This yielded weights with 80% of survey respondents being given a weight between 0.61 and 1.35. Slightly over 3% of respondents had reported incomplete or "Not Applicable" demographic information in our survey that made allocating them to one of the 48 cells impossible. These individuals were given unit weight. Broadly speaking, use of these weights appears to have minimal effect on our results. The residual concern is therefore that survey participation was thus unrepresentative within each strata.

B.2 Methodology and Structure

The first section of the survey included questions on eight political and social topics. Each topic presented two opposing viewpoints designed to capture opposite ends of the belief spectrum. For each topic, students answered five questions using a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 represented one polar opinion, 100 represented the opposite, and values in between indicated intermediate beliefs.

The five questions elicited the individual's:

1. *own view*: Own belief on the topic
2. *perceived campus mean*: Estimate of the average belief of Duke undergraduate students
3. *ideal campus mean*: Preferred average student belief on a hypothetical ideal campus
4. *lower bound*: Preferred/tolerated extreme low (conservative or right-wing) student belief on the hypothetical ideal campus
5. *upper bound*: Preferred/tolerated extreme high (progressive or left-wing) belief on the hypothetical ideal campus

[18] Based on the overlap between the survey categories we used and the categories reported in the Duke IPEDS data, we collapsed this field to a mutually exclusive choice from {Asian, Black, Hispanic, White, Other Race, International}, following the usual IPEDS convention where US non-resident status trumps Hispanic ethnicity which trumps the racial categories. Two or More Races was folded into Other.

Throughout, we refer to the gap between these latter two measures, that is the range of views that a student expresses willingness to tolerate on campus, as the student's desired Overton window.

To minimize bias, survey elements were randomized wherever possible. Topics appeared in a random order to ensure equal exposure across participants. Additionally, four topics were normalized such that a score of 0 represented a traditionally liberal view, while the other four had a score of 0 representing a traditionally conservative view. For our analysis, we undertook ex-post renormalization of the data such that 100 indicates the most extreme progressive or left-wing view, and 0 the most extreme conservative or right-wing view.

Each student was shown treatment information for three of the eight topics, selected at random.[19] Treatment involved being shown two approximately 100-word arguments, with one supporting each polar opinion. The remaining five topics (untreated) were displayed on a single page, while treated topics appeared on a separate page. Half of the students saw treated topics first; the other half saw untreated topics first. Analysis suggests these treatments had modest if any effects, and they are not the focus of this paper. Since treatment was randomly assigned, we treat this as a minor source of additional idiosyncratic variation.

The two opposing viewpoints for the eight topics on which beliefs were elicited were:

- 2020 Election Fraud (*election*): There was no widespread voter fraud in the 2020 election and Joe Biden was the rightful winner OR There was widespread voter fraud in the 2020 election and Donald Trump actually won the election
- Abortion (*abortion*): Abortion should be illegal in all cases OR Abortion should be legal in all cases
- Black Lives Matter (*BLM*): Black Lives Matter (BLM) is unequivocally a force for positive social change OR Black Lives Matter (BLM) is unequivocally a force for division and violence
- Gun Control (*guns*): All citizens should be able to privately own any type of gun without restriction OR No citizens should be able to privately own any type of gun
- Role of the U.S. Government (*govt*): The U.S. government tries to solve too many problems OR The U.S. government should do more to solve problems

[19] Each student was assigned to one of 8 treatment combinations. Each version involved treatment for three specific topics, formed as consecutive triples from a cyclic ordering of the eight topics. Writing the cyclic order as $A, \ldots, H$, the eight versions treat $\{ABC\}, \{BCD\}, \ldots, \{GHA\}, \{HAB\}$. Each topic is thus treated with probability 3/8.

- Access to hormone blockers for trans-identifying youth (*trans*): Prepubescent individuals who self-identify as transgender and want puberty blockers and/or gender-affirming hormones should **ALWAYS** be given access to them OR Prepubescent individuals who self-identify as transgender and want puberty blockers and/or gender-affirming hormones should **NEVER** be given access to them

- Free speech on campus (*speech*): Students and faculty should do whatever is necessary to keep guests with dangerous views from speaking OR Any invited speaker should always be allowed on campus regardless of their views

- Equality vs Equity (*equity*): Equality of opportunity is the most important aspect of a fair society OR Equity of outcome is the most important aspect of a fair society

We included two attention check questions in the survey, which had success rates of 99 percent and 90 percent, respectively. A third attention check was based on survey completion time defined as students who finished in less than half the median time (17 minutes and 28 seconds). About 91 percent of students passed this time-based check.

Only 12 responses (2.4 percent) failed two of the three checks, and none failed all three. This is suggestive that responses were overwhelmingly thoughtful and accurate. All eligible responses were included in the analysis, regardless of attention check performance.

B.3 Survey flow

A broad outline of the survey flow is as follows:

1. Introduction and asking for survey consent

2. Instructions on evaluating topic arguments

3. Beliefs regarding treated and untreated topic questions were solicited with both which topics were treated and the ordering of the topics randomized

4. Importance and confidence on each of the topics was solicited

5. When, where, and why students self-censored

6. Political beliefs and media consumption

7. Demographics

B.4 Adjustments to the Data

Two types of automated adjustments were made to survey responses.

The first involved changing certain "N/A" responses to 50. Due to a design issue in Qualtrics, the default slider was set at 50, but if left untouched, the response was recorded as "N/A." Based on students' answers to related questions within the same topic, we identified cases where N/A responses were likely intended to reflect a neutral position and adjusted them accordingly.

To do this, we required two separate checks: first an engagement test that the respondent had likely not deliberately skipped the question, the second a consistency test that 50 was a plausible answer based on their other responses. The engagement test required that at most two of the five questions on that topic were left blank, at most six of the eight topics were left blank on that question, and at most ten of the forty topic-belief responses were left blank in total. The consistency test required that for own belief and ideal mean belief, that the stated Overton window on that topic must contain 50, while for the ideal lower (upper) bound, that the own view and the other ideal-campus responses on that topic must lie at or above 50 (at or below 50). A missing comparator is treated as non-contradicting. The perceived campus mean is filled whenever the engagement conditions hold, as no other response on the topic bears on its plausibility.

The second adjustment involved removing a student's ideal-campus responses where they are mutually inconsistent. Responses are consistent if the lower bound is no greater than the ideal campus mean, which in turn is no greater than the upper bound. Where any observed pair violates this ordering, for example, if a student indicated that the lowest belief score on their ideal campus would be 50 and the highest would be 40, all three ideal-campus responses for that topic are set missing. Where one of the three is missing and those remaining are not in conflict, the responses are retained.

Additionally, six manual changes to correct respondent errors were made based on student requests, submitted either through the survey's final comment section or via direct email to the research team.

Appendix C Other Reasons for self-censorship

Of the 227 who responded that their political identity was far left or left, 26 (11%) reported one of the following other paraphrased (for privacy) reasons for self-censorship:[20]

- Want to remain ignorant of beliefs that invalidate my safety and identity
- Disrespecting someone else.
- Don't seek out or have opportunities to speak about these topics.
- Don't discuss politics
- Fear that administration won't treat me as an equal because I am a student
- Fear of having to defend my opinion on without preparation
- Fear of response from conservatives in positions of authority
- Fear that I do not have right information to be voicing an opinion
- Fear that people will not are not interested in discussion, but rather in argument or defending their own beliefs.
- Feeling like I still have a lot to learn and do not want to say something incorrect
- Don't want to contribute to polarization
- Don't want to invite a debate
- Don't see a need to share my beliefs if it is not required
- I've never been fearful of sharing opinions sometimes it just isn't the time or place
- Lack of knowledge of all the various arguments that may affect my opinion
- It doesn't come up in conversation
- Uncomfortable environment. So much so that safety is the biggest concern.
- not worth the fight
- Opinions will reveal aspects of my personal life

[20] Two responses (one left-leaning and one-right leaning) were removed because of revealing something about their personal background.

- Others don't have the background and research that I do so will dismiss my opinions. Concerned about seeming to radical.
- Social anxiety (3x)
- Some topics do not directly involve me. I have opinions but do not want to amplify my voice on something that is not about me
- Not always necessary to share everything I believe
- I don't feel the need to talk about it

Of the 95 respondents who identified as far right, right, or lean right, 16 (17%) reported one of the following other paraphrased (for privacy) reasons for self-censorship:

- My views are personal
- Being canceled (2x)
- Cancel culture
- Duke is a liberal institution where rich people pretend to care about poor people.
- Fear of consequences from the administration or grade penalties
- hasn't really come up
- I do not reveal my personal opinions so that people can never use them a way to judge me.
- I realize that everyone has their own opinion, and do not want to get into an argument about it
- Opinions that are not socially acceptable are not valued and people will change how they view me because of what I believe.
- Just being labeled as something I'm not, the feeling that I'm alone despite Duke students being a small, out of touch, part of the population
- Most of the time, sharing my opinion would be unproductive in the classroom
- Poor grading from professors
- Social consequences from saying the wrong opinion both from the university and from employers

- Doubt the ability of people to think for themselves
- Too conservative